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Given the alarming pace, level of sophistication, and globalized nature that illegal 
trade in wildlife has now notoriously achieved, UNEP initiated a Rapid Response 
Assessment to provide some of the latest data, analysis, and broadest insights into 
the phenomenon. Tackling illegal wildlife trade demands this examination of the 
relationship between the environmental resources at stake, their legal and illegal 
exploitation, the loopholes that exacerbate the situation, the scale and types of 
crimes committed, and the dynamics of the demand driving the trade.
In the international community, there is now growing recog-
nition that the issue of the illegal wildlife trade has reached 
significant global proportions. Illegal wildlife trade and envi-
ronmental crime involve a wide range of flora and fauna 
across all continents, estimated to be worth USD 70–213 
billion annually. This compares to a global official devel-
opment assistance envelope of about 135 billion USD per 
annum. The illegal trade in natural resources is depriving 
developing economies of billions of dollars in lost revenues 
and lost development opportunities, while benefiting a rela-
tively small criminal fraternity.
This report focuses on the far-reaching consequences of the 
environmental crime phenomenon we face today. The situa-
tion has worsened to the extent that illegal trade in wildlife’s 
impacts are now acknowledged to go well beyond strictly 
environmental impacts – by seriously undermining econo-
mies and livelihoods, good governance, and the rule of law. 
Even the security and safety of countries and communities is 
affected: the report highlights how wildlife and forest crime, 
including charcoal, provides potentially significant threat 
finance to militias and terrorist groups. Already recognized 
as a grave issue in DRC and Somalia by the UN Security 
Council, the assessment reveals that the scale and role of wild-
life and forest crime in threat finance calls for much wider 
policy attention, well beyond those regions. 
The consequences are increasingly evident: illegal wildlife 
trafficking constitutes a barrier to the achievement of both 
sustainable development and environmental sustainability. 
As reflected in a range of decisions of the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora, the UN Office for Drugs and Crime, the UN 
Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, 
INTERPOL, the UN Security Council, and others, the illegal 
trade in wildlife and environmental crime are now widely 
recognized as significant threats on a global scale, to be 
tackled with urgency. However the responses to date, in 
terms of impact on the ground, have been too modest, and 
inadequate to the scale and growth of the threat to wildlife 
and the environment.
A fuller understanding of the phenomenon of illegal wild-
life trade is necessary to design and further strengthen – 
and accelerate – an effective strategy to successfully tackle 
the issue at all levels and with all means possible. A global 
and holistic response needs to be implemented to support 
national, regional and international efforts by strengthening 
and synchronizing actions targeting coherent environmental 
legislation, poverty alleviation and demand reduction.
Achim Steiner
UN Under-Secretary General and UNEP Executive Director
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Ecosystems play a crucial role and especially for developing economies by 
supporting revenues, future development opportunities, livelihoods and sustain-
able harvest sectors relying heavily on natural resources, such as in agriculture, 
forestry and fisheries. Healthy ecosystems provide the platform upon which future 
food production and economies are ultimately based.
The opportunities ecosystems provide for future develop-
ment, however, are threatened by serious and increasingly 
sophisticated transnational organized environmental crime, 
undermining development goals and good governance. Trans-
national organized environmental crime may include illegal 
logging, poaching and trafficking of a wide range of animals, 
illegal fisheries, illegal mining and dumping of toxic waste. It 
is a rapidly rising threat to the environment, to revenues from 
natural resources, to state security, and to sustainable develop-
ment. Combined estimates from the OECD, UNODC, UNEP 
and INTERPOL place the monetary value of all transnational 
organized environmental crime between 70–213 billion USD 
annually. This compares to a global ODA of ca. 135 billion 
USD. Whilst therefore benefiting a relatively small criminal 
fraternity, the illegal trade in natural resources is otherwise 
depriving developing economies of billions of dollars in lost 
revenues and development opportunities.
The illegal trade in wildlife is no longer an emerging issue. The 
scale and nature of the challenge has been recognized in deci-
sions of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), the UN Commis-
sion on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, the Economic 
and Social Council (ECOSOC), the UN Security Council, UN 
General Assembly, INTERPOL, the World Customs Organi-
sation (WCO) and others, including at national levels. High-
level political conferences have also addressed the issue, most 
notably recently convened in Botswana and Paris (December 
2013), London (February 2014), and Dar es Salaam (May 
2014). However, the responses in terms of impact on the 
ground are still behind the scale and development of the 
threat to wildlife, including forests, as well as increasingly 
also development goals.
The illegal trade in fauna and flora has been estimated by 
different sources to be worth 7–23 billion dollars annually. 
The trade involves a wide range of species including insects, 
reptiles, amphibians, fish and mammals. It concerns both live 
and dead specimens or products thereof, used for pharmaceu-
tical, food, pets, ornamental or traditional medicinal purposes. 
Illegal harvest and trade includes a range of taxa such as 
gorillas, chimpanzees, elephants, tigers, rhinos, Tibetan ante-
lopes, bears, corals, birds, pangolins, reptiles, sturgeon for 
black caviar, and a wide range of other commercial fisheries 
species from the high seas and territorial waters. All of these 
have a significant value not only on the black market, but even 
more to national economies if managed sustainably. The illegal 
trade in wildlife operates per definition outside government 
official regulation and management, and thus represents a 
significant economic, environmental and security threat that 
has received relatively little attention in the past.
The possible number of elephants killed in Africa is in the 
range of 20–25,000 elephants per year out of a population 
of 420,000–650,000. For the forest elephant, population 
size has been estimated to decline by ca. 62% between 2002 
and 2011. Poached African ivory may represent an end-user 
street value in Asia of an estimated USD 165–188 million of 
8raw ivory, in addition to ivory from Asian sources. For rhinos, 
some 94% of the poaching takes place in Zimbabwe and 
South Africa, which have the largest remaining populations. 
Here poaching has increased dramatically from possibly less 
than 50 in 2007 to over 1,000 in 2013 involving organized 
syndicates. Rhinos have disappeared entirely from several 
Asian and African countries in recent years. Rhino horn 
poached last year is valued around USD 63.8 – 192 million 
USD, much less at the frontline. 
The scale of revenue from wildlife crime is dwarfed by the 
income from illegal logging and forest crime. Forest crime, 
such as illegal logging, has previously been estimated to 
represent a value of 30–100 billion USD annually or 10–30% 
of the total global timber trade. An estimated 50–90% of 
the wood in some individual tropical countries is suspected 
to come from illegal sources or has been logged illegally. 
Forest crime appears to take place in four forms: 1) The illegal 
exploitation of high-value endangered (CITES listed) wood 
species, including rosewood and mahogany; 2) Illegal logging 
of timber for sawn wood, building material and furniture; 3) 
Illegal logging and laundering of wood through plantation 
and agricultural front companies to supply pulp for the paper 
industry; and 4) Utilization of the vastly unregulated woodfuel 
and charcoal trade to conceal illegal logging in and outside 
protected areas, conduct extensive tax evasion and fraud, and 
supply fuel through the informal sector.
For pulp and paper production, networks of shell companies 
and plantations are actively used to by-pass logging morato-
riums under the pretext of agricultural or palm- oil invest-
ments, used to funnel illegal timber through plantations, or 
to ship wood and pulp via legal plantations in order to re-clas-
sify pulp or wood as legal production, undermining also legal 
business and production. 
These methods effectively bypass many current customs 
efforts related to the Lacey Act and the EU FLEGT programme 
to restrict the import of illegal tropical wood to the US and to 
the EU, respectively. Based on data from EUROSTAT, FAO 
and the International Tropcial Timber Organization (ITTO), 
the EU and the US annually imports approximately 33.5 
million tons of tropical wood in all its forms. It is estimated 
that 62–86% of all suspected illegal tropical wood entering 
the EU and US arrives in the form of paper, pulp or wood 
chips, not as roundwood or sawnwood or furniture products, 
which have received the most attention in the past.
In Africa 90% of wood consumed is used for woodfuel and 
charcoal (regional range 49–96%), with an official char-
coal production of 30.6 million tons in 2012, worth approxi-
mately USD 9.2–24.5 billion annually. The unregulated char-
coal trade alone involves an annual revenue loss of at least 
USD 1.9 billion to African countries. With current trends in 
urbanization and the projected population increase of another 
1.1 billion people in Sub-Saharan Africa by 2050, the demand for 
charcoal is expected to at least triple in the coming three decades. 
This will generate severe impacts like large–scale deforesta-
tion, pollution and subsequent health problems in slum areas, 
especially for women. The increased charcoal demand will also 
strongly accelerate emissions from both forest loss and emis-
sions of short-lived climate pollutants – black carbon. Internet 
listings reveal over 1,900 charcoal dealers in Africa alone. At 
least 300 of these are exporting minimum orders of 10–20 tons 
of charcoal per shipment. Their minimum daily orders exceed 
the official total annual exports for some countries. For East, 
Central and West Africa, the net profits from dealing and taxing 
unregulated, illicit or illegal charcoal combined is estimated at 
USD 2.4–9 billion, compared to the USD 2.65 billion worth of 
street value heroin and cocaine in the region. 
Wildlife and forest crime has a serious role in threat finance 
to organized crime, and non-state armed groups including 
terrorist groups. Ivory also provides a portion of income raised 
by militia groups in the DRC and CAR, and is likely a primary 
source of income to the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) currently 
operating in the border triangle of South Sudan, CAR and 
DRC. Ivory similarly provides a source of income to Sudanese 
Janjaweed and other horse gangs operating between Sudan, 
Chad and Niger. However, given the estimated elephant popu-
lations and the number of projected killed elephants within the 
striking range of these militia groups, the likely annual income 
from ivory to militias in the entire Sub-Saharan range is likely 
in the order of USD 4.0–12.2 million.
Illicit taxing of charcoal, commonly up to 30% of the value, is 
conducted on a regular basis by organized criminals, militias 
and terrorist groups across Africa. Militias in DRC are esti-
mated to make USD 14–50 million annually on road taxes. 
Al Shabaab’s primary income appears to be from informal 
taxation at roadblock checkpoints and ports. In one roadblock 
case they have been able to make up to USD 8–18 million 
per year from charcoal traffic in Somalia’s Badhadhe District. 
Trading in charcoal and taxing the ports have generated an 
estimated annual total of USD 38–56 million for Al Shabaab. 
The overall size of the illicit charcoal export from Somalia has 
been estimated at USD 360–384 million per year. For African 
countries with ongoing conflicts, including Mali, CAR, DRC, 
Sudan and Somalia, a conservative estimate is that the militia 
and terrorist groups in the regions may gain USD 111–289 
million USD annually, dependent upon prices, from their 
involvement in, and taxing of, the illegal or unregulated char-
coal trade. More investigation is needed to determine the role 
of charcoal for threat finance.
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Responses
Illegal trade in forest and wildlife products, as well as the 
illegal exploitation of natural resources is now widely recog-
nized as a significant threat to both the environment and 
to sustainable development. This is reflected in a range of 
decisions from CITES, from the UN Commission on Crime 
Prevention and Criminal Justice, INTERPOL and the UN 
Security Council, including on Somalia and DRC. 
International enforcement collaboration, such as the 
International Consortium on Combating Wildlife Crime 
(ICCWC), which includes CITES, UNODC, INTERPOL, the 
World Bank and WCO, together with increased collaboration 
amongst agencies, such as with UNEP, and with countries, 
has created a more effective structure to provide support to 
countries in the fields of policing, customs, prosecution and 
the judiciary. These initiatives have revealed important and 
significant early results. 
Poaching for Shahtoosh wool from Tibetan or Chiru antelopes 
caused a dramatic drop of likely 80–90% or nearly a million 
Chiru antelopes in China in the 1990–2000s and resulted 
in a significant environmental, police and military effort to 
prevent eradication. It was combined with the establishment 
of some of the largest protected areas in world. While popula-
tions are slowly recovering, they are still very vulnerable and 
more surveys urgently needed.
Brazil is probably one of the world’s leading countries in a wide 
enforcement effort to reduce illegal deforestation by tackling the 
full criminal chain and their networks. Deforestation in Brazil’s 
Amazon reached its lowest level in 2012, since monitoring of 
the forest began in 1988. It went down by 64–78%, depending 
upon estimates, primarily as a result of a coordinated enforce-
ment approach using satellite imagery and targeted police oper-
ations and investigations. This was supported by large-scale 
efforts through REDD and other initiatives to strengthen the 
participatory processes of indigenous peoples, stake holders 
and alternative livelihoods. Many parts of the world could learn 
from the measures and actions undertaken by Brazil.
In Tanzania over 1,100 rangers have received specialized 
training in the past two years. The training covers tracking 
of poachers, tactics and wildlife crime scene management, 
and it has been done under the auspices of INTERPOL and 
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UNODC, and has resulted in a series of frontline arrests 
linking suspects to the scene of crime. The training has not 
only improved rangers’ ability to stop and arrest poachers, 
but it has also supported successful prosecutions and good 
enforcement ethics based on evidence, prosecution and 
trial in court. The work they are doing is critical and also 
dangerous. Over 1,000 rangers are claimed killed worldwide 
in service to protect wildlife in the last decades.
Improved intelligence sharing among agencies has also 
enabled INTERPOL to support countries in larger and more 
effective police operations, leading to larger seizures of illegal 
timber and wildlife products. In 2013 Operation Lead, under 
INTERPOL’s project LEAF, was conducted in Costa Rica and 
Venezuela. It resulted in 292,000 cubic meters of wood and 
wood products seized – equivalent to 19,500 truckloads (worth 
ca. USD 40 million). Operation Wildcat in East Africa involved 
wildlife enforcement officers, forest authorities, park rangers, 
police and customs officers from five countries ‒ Mozambique, 
South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, resulting in 
240 kg of elephant ivory seized and 660 arrests. 
On customs, the UNODC-WCO Container Control 
Programme (CCP) has been successful in targeting sea and 
dry port container shipments in an increasing number of 
countries. Seizures include not only counterfeits and drugs, 
but also wildlife and timber products, such as ivory, rhino 
horn and rosewood.
An Indonesian case has shown how money-laundering meas-
ures can lead to prosecutions for illegal logging. A UNODC 
training course in 2012 involved Indonesian financial inves-
tigative and anti-corruption agencies (PPATK, KPK) ranging 
from the federal to the local levels. Methods learnt in the 
course were applied to detect, investigate and prosecute 
illegal logging. After the course the Financial Investigative 
Units detected highly suspicious transactions leading to the 
conviction of a timber-smuggling suspect who was sentenced 
to eight years of imprisonment with evidence showing how 
USD 127 million passed through his accounts. 
However, the scale and coordination of the efforts must be 
substantially increased and a widened effort implemented. 
They must be combined with efforts on good governance, 
management and consumer awareness to ensure a long-term 
demand reduction. It is particularly crucial to support the 
countries directly, as financial resources need to be directed 
towards efforts with effect on the ground, whether in enforce-
ment, governance or consumer awareness.
The pace, level of sophistication and globalized nature of wild-
life and forest crime is beyond the capacity of many countries 
and individual organizations to address. Of particular rele-
vance is the increasing involvement of transnational organ-
ized crime in the illegal trade of wildlife and timber, as well as 
the significant impact on the environment and development.
Solutions will require a combination of efforts to address both 
supply and demand reduction, based on deterrence, transpar-
ency, legal enforcement, behavioral change and alternative live-
lihoods. Differentiated strategies for addressing illegal wildlife 
and timber trafficking must be developed across the relevant 
value chains (source, transit and destination countries)
A coherent effort to fully address the multiple dimensions of 
environmental crime and its implications for development 
is needed. This will require both national and international 
stakeholders to be involved in the process, including envi-
ronmental, enforcement and development sectors, as well as 
stakeholders involved in security and peacekeeping missions. 
Environmental crime provides a serious threat to wildlife and 
plant species, ecosystems, their services, climate change and 
to good governance and sustainable development goals and 
requires a multi-faceted response
10 11
Recommendations
Acknowledge the multiple dimensions of environ­
mental crime and its serious impact on the environment 
and sustainable development goals, and help support and 
balance the appropriate coordination and sharing of infor-
mation from stakeholders, such as civil society, private sector, 
indigenous peoples, governments and a wider UN system 
with the need and recognition of also the role of law enforce-
ment in good environmental governance. 
Call for a comprehensive coordinated UN system 
and national approach to environmental crime by
helping coordinate efforts on environmental legislation and 
regulations, poverty alleviation and development support with 
responses from the enforcement sector to curb environmental 
crime, as part of a holistic approach to challenge the serious 
threat to both the environment and sustainable development 
caused by the continued environmental crime.
Further call upon UNEP as the global environ­
mental authority to address the serious and rising
environ mental impacts of environmental crime and to 
engage the relevant coordination mechanisms of the UN 
system to support countries and national, regional and inter-
national law enforcement agencies with relevant environ-
mental information to facilitate their efforts to combat the 
illegal trade in wildlife species and their products, as well as 
illegal logging and illegal trade in timber. 
Calls upon the entire international and bilateral 
donor community to recognize and address environ­
mental crime as a serious threat to sustainable develop­
ment and revenues, and to support national, regional and global 
efforts for the effective implementation of, compliance with and 
enforcement of targeted measures to curb illegal trade in wildlife 
species and their products as well as illegal logging in timber.
Support immediate, decisive and collective action 
to narrow the gap between commitments and 
compliance, such as the ones expressed in multilateral envi-
ronmental agreements, through national implementation 
and enforcement, including the relevant decisions and reso-
lutions taken by their governing bodies intended to combat 
the illicit trade in wildlife and forest products. 
Identify end­user markets and systematically 
design, support and implement where appropriate 
consumer awareness campaigns focusing on high 
consumer end-markets. Call upon both Governments and the 
UN system to effectively work with and engage civil society and 
the private sector in efforts to identify alternatives to consumer 
demands for traded wildlife species and forest products.
Strengthen awareness through certification 
schemes, such as e.g. the Forest Stewardship Council 
(FSC), to facilitate consumer recognition of legal and illegal 
products. This especially applies to such wood products as 
paper that currently include the largest share of import-ex-
ports of tropical wood, as well as to CITES-listed species and 
their products. To this end, both voluntary, market and legisla-
tive approaches could enhance collaboration between govern-
ments, civil society and the private sector. 
Strengthen institutional, legal and regulatory 
systems to further combat corruption to effectively
address wildlife-related offences and to ensure that legal trade 
is monitored and managed effectively.
Strengthen international and development support 
to the entire enforcement chain, including frontline, 
investigator, customs, prosecutors and the judiciary, with 
particular reference to environmental crime to support legal 
revenues and sustainable development, and to reduce the 
impacts on the environment from environmental crime. 
Strengthen support to INTERPOL, UNODC, WCO 
and CITES, such as through ICCWC as well as
individual programmes, to enable them to support member 
states and other relevant stakeholders to further identify, 
develop and implement the most appropriate responses 
to environmental crime, reflecting and acknowledging the 
serious threats and effects it has on environmental govern-
ance, wildlife, ecosystems and the services it provides.
Invest in capacity building and technological 
support to national environment, wildlife and law
enforcement agencies to enable them to further protect 
key populations of iconic endangered species threatened by 
poaching, such as but not limited to, rhinos, tigers and the 
African elephant as a necessary response to safeguard these 
species from poaching, alongside renewed efforts to strength-
ening habitat protection and management. 
Strengthen environmental legislation, compliance 
and awareness and call upon enforcement agencies
and countries to reduce the role of illicit trade and 
taxing of forest and wildlife products for threat finance 
to non-state armed groups and terrorism. Strengthen specif-
ically the research on the possible role of trade in wildlife 
and timber products including charcoal for threat finance 
















Ecosystems play a crucial role and especially for developing economies by supporting 
revenues, future development opportunities, livelihoods and sustainable harvest in agri-
culture, forestry and fisheries. Ecosystems support tourism, valued at 5–10% of national 
economies.1 Ecosystems also supply vital services, such as buffering effects of extreme 
weather such as floods, drought and cyclones, and through provision of safe water supply 
to cities. They are valued globally at up to USD 72 trillion.2 Healthy ecosystems provide 
the platform upon which future food production and economies are ultimately based.3
Opportunities, management and future development are also threatened by serious 
and increasingly sophisticated transnational organized environmental crime, which 
is undermining development goals and good governance. Transnational organized 
environmental crime may include illegal logging, poaching and trafficking of wildlife, 
illegal fisheries, mining and dumping of toxic waste. It is a rapidly rising threat to the 
environment, to revenues from natural resources, to state security, and to sustainable 
development. Individual estimates from the OECD, UNEP, INTERPOL and UNODC 
place the monetary value of different forms of transnational organized environmental 
crimes to between USD 70–213 billion annually.4 This compares to a 2013 global ODA 
of ca. USD 135 billion.5
Wildlife crime is no longer an emerging issue. The scale and 
nature of the challenge has been accepted in decisions of the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of 
Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)(see decisions and resolutions 
following COP 16)6, the UN Commission on Crime Prevention 
and Criminal Justice and UNODC,7 the Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC), the UN Security Council, UN General 
Assembly, INTERPOL,8 the World Customs Organisation 
(WCO) and others, including many significant nations. High-
level political conferences have also addressed the issue, most 
notably recently convened in Botswana and Paris (December 
2013), London (February 2014), and Dar-es-Salaam (May 2014). 
However, the responses in terms of impact on the ground are 
still behind the scale and development of the threat to wildlife, 
including forests, as well as increasingly also development goals. 
Transnational organized environmental crime involves 
primarily five key areas: 
1. Illegal logging and deforestation 
2. Illegal fisheries 
3. Illegal mining and trade in minerals including conflict 
diamonds
4. Illegal dumping and trade in hazardous and toxic waste 
5. Illegal trade and poaching of wildlife and plants 
The illegal trade in wildlife is particularly challenging as it 
involves multiple dimensions, including poverty, governance 
and is often hidden in legal trade. It also commonly involves 
the mixing of legal and illegal harvesting of resources. Such 
harvesting is done using advanced, deliberate and carefully 
executed systems of laundering of illegally procured wood, 
charcoal, bushmeat and fish or other wildlife products. 
Illegal trade in wildlife can involve complex combinations 
of methods, including trafficking, forgery, bribes, use of 
14
shell companies, violence, and even hacking of government 
websites to obtain or forge permits. The hacking of websites 
shows some actors’ level of sophistication. The more typical 
and easier way, however, is simply to bribe corrupt officials 
so that they issue the necessary and required permits and 
certificates and other relevant documents. In this way laun-
dering of illegally sourced wood, fish and other wildlife prod-
ucts in the supply chain is commonly practiced. Corruption 
is a deeply embedded feature of environmental crime, facil-
itating crime across all levels of the supply chains. Compre-
hensive anti-corruption measures must be a key feature of 
the overall effort. 
Due to the complexity of the issue of illegal wildlife trade, a 
diverse response is required in the short and long-term, and 
from local to international levels. To curb the rise in illegal 
wildlife trade responses must involve a range of legal meas-
ures, enforcement, legislation, regulation, environmental 
management, consumer- and demand-reduction strategies, 
and promotion of alternative livelihood opportunities. Fully 
understanding the phenomenon of illegal wildlife trade 
requires a broad insight into the relationship between the envi-
ronmental resources at stake, their legal and illegal exploita-
tion, loopholes, the scale and type of crimes committed, and 
the dynamics of the demand driving the trade. The resulting 
threat finance fuelling conflicts and terrorism is often also an 
integral element of the supply chain. 
Illegal trade in wildlife is depriving developing economies of 
billions of dollars in lost revenues and development oppor-
tunities. Due to the problem’s broad scale, a comprehensive 
approach is required. To curb the rise in environmental crime 
the response must involve legal responses, enforcement, legis-
lation, regulation, environmental management, consumer- 
and demand-reduction strategies, and alternative livelihood 
opportunities. Understanding the phenomenon requires 
a broad insight into the relationship between the environ-
mental resources at stake, their legal and illegal exploitation, 
loopholes, as well as the scale and type of crimes committed. 
The threat finance fuelling conflicts and terrorism is often an 
integrated part of this picture, and must be taken into account.
Environmental crimes are difficult to define as they involve a 
range of types of crime of varying gravity. A helpful starting point 
is the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime 
(UNTOC), which defines a transnational organized crime as 
“any serious transnational offence undertaken by three or 
more people with the aim of material gain”. The problem with 
relying only on this definition is that ‘serious crime’ is defined 
as an offence punishable by a maximum prison sentence of 
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at least four years or more. A definitive definition of environ-
mental crime, which is enforceable throughout the transna-
tional crime chain, is therefore urgently needed to ensure a 
common understanding of the terminology.
Legislation on environmental crimes in many countries is 
under-developed. Sentencing guidelines typically address petty 
crimes and do not reflect the very serious nature and involve-
ment of organized crime and the impacts it has on environment, 
economic and social development of the countries and local 
communities or populations. They do not take into account the 
sheer scale of loss of resources, money laundering or threats to 
state security involved. Existing laws in most countries are already 
in place to address such serious crimes, but there is a consider-
able lack of awareness of how environmental crime often falls 
into other categories of far more serious violations. Often the 
wrong laws, such as those pertaining to pure environmental 
violations are applied in court, rather than those addressing the 
involvement of organized crime, tax fraud, violence, trafficking 
and even funding of non-state armed groups. 
The lack of information regarding the role of environmental 
crime in threat finance – the financing of criminal networks 
and non-state armed groups including militias, extremists and 
terrorism – thus lead to comparatively trivial sentences of only 
minimal fines and occasionally short-term prison sentences. 
Insufficient investigation of the role of networks in environ-
mental crime, which in many cases in practice constitutes 
threat finance, too often leads to failure in prosecution. This gap 
is being heavily exploited by organized crime to exploit natural 
resources, expand their illicit business sectors and contribute to 
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University, Human Trafficking Task Force; Greenpeace, The 
Toxic Ship, 2010; National Geographic press review.
Sources: TRAFFIC; FAO; UNODC;
 Global Financial Integrity
Figure 2. Number of transactions registered in wildlife and 
plants by CITES.
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the countries. The IUU fishing off Senegal constitute a loss of 
about USD 300 million in 2012, which is 2 per cent of GDP.13 
Of even greater concern is the impact of illegal logging on 
carbon emissions and loss of revenues. Tropical deforestation 
accounts for 10–15% of global emissions, and nearly 50–90% of 
the logging is illegal in major tropical countries14 – with direct 
threats to emission reductions schemes and programmes such 
as REDD, REDD+ and UN REDD. 
The substantial rise and extent of transnational organized 
environmental crime also endangers human- and state secu-
rity by facilitating and spreading collusive corruption. Loss of 
revenues for the economic development of many countries 
impacting upon food security, damage to the environment and 
the ecosystems vital for the services they provide for the local 
population, is highly damaging to developing countries, as the 
largest share of the proceeds leave the countries or go to tax 
havens or foreign nationals.
Scale of environmental crime
The economic impact of loss of resources and revenues from envir-
onmental crime is substantial – especially on illegal logging and 
fisheries – and probably just as large as or well exceed global ODA 
(Official Development Assistance) of around USD 135 billion.
wildlife or forest products also provides a safe haven or venue 
to conceal ex pat finance to extremist groups.
In the past decade, CITES, INTERPOL, UNODC (UN Office for 
Drugs and Crime), and UNEP (UN Environment Programme) 
have warned against the rise of organized transnational envir-
onmental crime. More sophisticated ways to conduct illegal 
extraction of resources along with more advanced laundering 
methods of both illegally extracted resources and the proceeds 
from the illegal trade have been observed,9 Furthermore, organ-
ized crime involved in drugs, trafficking, violence, murder and 
corruption undermine human- and state security. Criminal 
actors from other criminal sectors are attracted to environ-
mental crime because of a combination of high profits and low 
probability of getting caught and convicted. This applies espe-
cially with respect to transnational activities, where enforce-
ment has been virtually non-existent until now.10
Great concern has been expressed concerning illegal 
fishery off the coast of West Africa and its impact on local 
fishermen. The illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) 
fishing off West Africa, comprising between one third and 
half the catch, is worth USD 1.3 billion per year.11 Illegal fish-
eries have been previously discussed for Somalia, with links 
to piracy.12 Such fisheries involve major loss of revenues to 
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Source or reviews
UNEP/INTERPOL 2012 (10–30% of the global 
trade); OECD 2012
OECD 2012; MRAG og UBC 2008 (12–32% of 
the global trade)
GFI 2011; GA 2012 (Estimated as only 1–4% by 
industry of the global trade)
US 2000; GA 2012
Wyler and Sheik 2008; GFI 2011; OECD 2012






Minus 70–minus 213 billion
Ca. 135 billion
Environmental crime
Illegal logging and trade
Illegal fisheries 
Illegal extraction and trade in minerals/
mining
Illegal trade and dumping of hazardous 
waste 
Illegal trade and poaching of plants and 
wildlife 
Sum environmental crime and loss 
from primarily developing countries
Official development assistance (ODA)
(2013 estimate)
Table 1: Different forms of environmental crime and their approximate estimated scale. Great uncertainties exist regarding 






The illegal trade in wildlife has been estimated by different sources to be worth 
7–23 billion dollars annually,17 involving a wide range of species including insects, 
reptiles, amphibians, fish and mammals. It concerns both live and dead specimens 
or products thereof. The specimens and products are used for pharmaceutical, 
ornamental or traditional medicinal purposes. The transnational pet trade in trop-
ical fish, primates and reptiles is also a major beneficiary of illegal harvest and 
trades. Illegal harvest and trade further includes a range of species from iconic ones 
like gorillas, chimpanzees and orangutans, elephants, tigers, rhinos, Chiru ante-
lopes and bears to corals, birds, pangolins, reptiles and sturgeon for black caviar. 
All of these have a significant value not only on the black market, but even more 
to national economies if managed sustainably. Environmental crime operates per 
definition outside government regulation and management, and thus represents a 
significant economic, environmental and not least security threat that has received 
little attention in the past.
Annually, the international wildlife trade is estimated by 
CITES to include hundreds of millions of plant and animal 
specimens. The trade is diverse, ranging from live animals 
and plants to a vast array of wildlife products derived from 
them, including food products, exotic leather goods, wooden 
musical instruments, timber, tourist curios and medicines. 
Levels of exploitation of some animal and plant species are 
high and the trade in them, together with other factors, such 
as habitat loss, is capable of heavily depleting their populations 
and even bringing some species close to extinction. Many wild-
life species in trade are not endangered, but the existence of an 
agreement to ensure the sustainability of the trade is impor-
tant in order to safeguard these resources for the future.
Because the trade in wild animals and plants crosses borders 
between countries, the effort to regulate it requires interna-
tional cooperation to safeguard certain species from over-ex-
ploitation. CITES, in collaboration with the states, helps 
provide varying degrees of protection to more than 35,000 
species of animals and plants, whether they are traded as live 
specimens, fur coats or dried herbs. CITES also regulates 
trade in more marine species following COP 16 decisions.
Bushmeat hunting – the hunting of wild animals for food – is 
also a major threat to wildlife populations across the globe – 
including in protected areas.
A high number of iconic species like rhinos, tigers, great apes 
and elephants, to mention a few, are also victims of the illicit 
trade. But many other species are also being hunted inten-
sively, such as guanacos in Argentina–Chile, and Saiga ante-
lopes in Kazakhstan, where populations crashed following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union by over 95%.18
24
Figure 3: The illicit bushmeat trade involves a series of underlying socio-economic factors, but leads, with rising population 
densities, to local depletions of wildlife species, and increasingly inside protected areas.
The bushmeat chain reaction
Source: Redmond, I., et al., Recipes for Survival: 
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Figure 4: Saigas have been hunted since prehistoric times and today poaching remains the primary threat to this critically endan-
gered species. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Saiga populations crashed by more than 95% within a decade. While 





















Overall direction of migrations 
(North in summer, South in winter)
Source: ACBK, 2011; WWF Mongolia, Web-based GIS database on 
biological diversity of Mongolia; UNEP-WCMC, Protected Planet web 








The effect of roads, expanding agriculture and livestock, 
along with increased poaching can also be observed 
in South America, such as on the wild camelids in the 
steppe, deserts and Andean foothills of Argentina and 
Chile. Guanacos (Lama guanicoe) and vicunãs (Vicugna 
vicugna) have lost 40–75 per cent of their ranges, and 
probably dropped at least 90 per cent in their numbers 
over the last centuries (Cajal, 1991; Franklin et al., 1997). 
Only a fraction, probably less than 3 per cent of the 
guanaco and some 34 per cent of that of vicunãs are in 
protected areas (Donadio and Buskirk, 2006). Also these 
species often avoid areas with expanding livestock and 
have been heavily exposed to poaching.
Source: Cajal, J. L. 1991. An integrated approach to the management of 
wild camelidsin Argentina. In Mares, M. A. &Schmidly, D. J. (eds.), Latin 
American Mammology.History, Biodiversity and Conservation.University 
of Oklahoma Press, Norman; Donadio, E. &Buskirk, S. W. 2006. Flight 
behavior of guanacos and vicunas in areas of western Argentina with and 
without poaching.Biological Conservation 127: 139-145Franklin, W. L., Bas, 
F., Bonacic, C. F., Cunazza, C. & Soto N. 1997. Striving to manage Patagonia 
guanacos for sustained use in the grazing agroecosystems of southern 
Chile. Wildlife Soc. Bull.25: 65–73
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Illicit trade in Great apes
The primary threat to the Great apes is habitat loss. However, 
great apes are also trafficked in various ways. In many cases 
wild capture is opportunistic: farmers capture infant apes 
after having killed the mother during a crop-raid, or bush-
meat hunters shoot or trap adults for food, and then collect 
the babies to sell. Organized illicit dealers increasingly target 
great apes as part of a far more sophisticated and systematic 
trade. They use transnational criminal networks to supply 
a range of markets, including the tourist entertainment 
industry, disreputable zoos, and wealthy individuals who 
want exotic pets as status symbols. Great apes are used to 
attract tourists to entertainment facilities such as amuse-
ment parks and circuses. They are even used in tourist photo 
sessions on Mediterranean beaches and boxing matches in 
Asian safari parks. 
Even conservative estimates suggest that the illegal trade in 
great apes is widespread. From 2005 to 2011, a minimum of 
643 chimpanzees, 48 bonobos, 98 gorillas and 1,019 orangu-
tans are documented to have been lost from the wild through 
illicit activities. These numbers are based on seizures and 
arrival rates of orphans at sanctuaries in 12 African countries 
and rehabilitation centres in Indonesia, expert reports, and 
great ape bushmeat and body parts seized from illegal traders. 
Based on extrapolations, it is likely that as many as 22,218 
wild great apes were lost between 2005 and 2011 related to 
the illegal trade, with chimpanzees comprising 64 per cent 
of that number. The annual average loss of 2,972 great apes 
could have serious consequences for the biodiversity of key 
regions, given the important role great apes play in main-
taining healthy ecosystems. Sadly, law enforcement efforts 
lag far behind the rates of illegal trade. Only 27 arrests were 
made in Africa and Asia in connection with great ape trade 
between 2005 and 2011, and one quarter of the arrests were 
never prosecuted. 
Prices for great apes vary greatly. A poacher may sell a live 
chimpanzee for USD 50–100, whereas the middleman will 
resell that same chimpanzee at a mark-up of as much as 
400 per cent. Orangutans can fetch USD 1,000 at resale, and 
gorillas illegally sold to a zoo in Malaysia in 2002 reportedly 
went for USD 400,000 each. Such prices are extremely rare 
however, and the poacher who captures a live specimen may 
lose it to injuries, illness or stress, or have it confiscated if the 
poacher is arrested. At best, the actual poachers may earn only 





CITES-MIKE (Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants)20 
and subsequent analysis suggests that 15,000 elephants 
were illegally killed at the 42 monitored MIKE sites in 2012. 
The Elephant Trade Information System (ETIS), managed 
by TRAFFIC21 shows that the overall weight and number of 
large-scale ivory seizures (more than 500 kg) in 2013 exceeded 
any previous year in the ETIS data, with the increase either 
reflecting increased law enforcement effort or increase in 
the trade. For the forest elephant, population size has been 
estimated to decline by ca. 62% between 2002 and 2011.22 
Possible range of killed elephants in Africa is likely in the 
range of 22–25,000 elephants per year.23 Population size is 
estimated at 420,000–650,000 elephants.24
If we assume that 22–25,000 elephants are killed per year, 
with 1.8 tusks per elephant and 5.5 kg per tusk (ca. 10 kg 
per elephant) and a price of 750 USD/kg25 of raw ivory in 
Asia the poached African ivory may represent an end-user 
street value in Asia of an estimated 165–188 million USD, in 
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Source: UNODC, The Globalization of Crime, 2010
Source: CITES trade statistics derived from the CITES Trade Database, UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre, Cambridge, UK
Source: TRAFFIC,  The South Africa – Viet Nam





Illegal wildlife trafficking affects species population
Wildlife  (plants and animals) trafficking recorded transitions
Thousands
Figure 5: Illegal wildlife trafficking affects species population.
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Figure 6: Rhinos were hunted intensively during the war in 
Nepal in the early to mid 2000s, with catastrophic effects such 
as in Bardia National park.33
Map by Philippe Rekacewicz
Rhino horn
Approximately 94% of rhino poaching takes place in Zimbabwe 
and South Africa, which have by far the largest remaining popu-
lations, and has increased dramatically from possibly less than 
50 in 2007 to over 1,000 rhinos poached in 2013, involving 
organized crime. Population size of black and white rhinos was 
ca. 4,800 and 20,100 in 2010 respectively, with Asian one-
horned rhinoceros numbering ca. 3,600 individuals.27
Separatist groups in the 1980s and 1990s killed all of the 
one-horned rhinoceros in two Indian parks – Laokhowa and 
Manas.28
Between 1994 and 2000, the rhino population size in Nepal 
increased from 466 to 544 individuals. During the subse-
quent war, the population dropped to 372 in 2005, and was 
estimated to 446 individuals in three Terai protected areas of 
Nepal in 2006.29 Correspondingly, rhinos were almost erad-
icated in Maoist controlled Bardia National Park in Nepal 
during the war there in the 2000s. The peace agreements 
stipulated removal of military patrols in the park amongst the 
terms of peace negotiations at several stages.30 Here, numbers 
dropped from around 67 (with 18 accounted for by poachers 
and natural deaths in 2000) to around only 22 remaining 
in 2008.31 Rhinos have disappeared entirely from several 
Asian and African countries in recent years, although overall 
numbers of rhino in Africa have been increasing. The last 
rhino in Mozambique was shot in 2013. According to media 
reports an underpaid ranger was accused of leading poachers 
to the site for a bribe of USD 80.32 While that case is uncon-
firmed, the presence of well-paid and well-trained rangers is 
critical for frontline protection irrespective of international 
agreements and intentions. Rhino horn poached last year is 
valued around USD 63.8–192 million street value, and much 
less at the frontline of poaching.
38
Poaching of Tigers
Tigers (Panthera tigris), with six remaining sub-species 
including the Siberian tiger, are classified as endangered by 
CITES. They inhabit the Siberian taiga, as well as grasslands, 
jungles and swamps in Asia. The global population in the wild 
is estimated to number between 3,000 and 3,900 individuals, 
down from around 100,000 at the start of the 20th century. 
Between 1990 and 1992, China recorded exporting 27 
million units of tiger products.34 In 1993, China banned its 
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with other origins including Nepal and India, as well as Sibe-
rian tigers. The poaching has resulted in a sharp decline in 
the tiger population and extinction of 3 of the 9 sub-species. 
At present they are found in Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, 
China, India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, 
Russia, Vietnam and Thailand. 
The decline is a result of habitat loss, hunting and poaching for 
use in traditional medicine. To date, there is no evidence that 
tiger products have any medical effect, and their use represents 
superstition and beliefs, as the far majority of “tiger” prod-
ucts contain no tiger products at all. Among other things, it is 
believed to cure joint and back pains, paralysis and muscular 
spasms, as well as providing powerful protection. Tiger parts 
have no scientifically proven medicinal properties. Reported 
prices vary greatly, from wholesale of around USD 4,000–
6,000, with some claiming up to USD 20,000–30,000. The 
sale of products from the bones of a single wild caught tiger 
can be in the range of USD 1,250–3,750 per kilogram, with 
an average of 20 kg of bones per tiger.35 Other quoted prices 
have been USD 370–400 for one kilogram of tiger bone, and 
around USD 200 for eyes (claimed erroneously to fight epilepsy 
and malaria). A kilogram of powdered humerus bone (erro-
neously claimed suitable for treating ulcers, rheumatism and 
typhoid) can be over USD 3,000. For powdered bones in general 
prices are estimated to be between USD 140–370 per kilogram 
depending on the size of the bones.36
Surveys of 1880 residents from a total of six Chinese cities 
in 200737 revealed that 43% of respondents had consumed 
some products alleged to contain tiger parts. Of the respond-
ents 88% knew that it was illegal to buy or sell tiger prod-
ucts. People from all income groups used tiger-bone plasters, 
where the highest demand was among older consumers and 
women. However, out of seven brands of plasters tested, none 
contained even a trace of tiger bone.38 A 2005–2006 survey 
of 518 traditional medicine stores in China found no plasters 
listing tigers as an ingredient.39
The international community has strongly expressed the need 
for effective law enforcement action against tiger crime. At 
the Saint Petersburg Global Tiger Summit in 2010, leaders 
from the 13 tiger range countries endorsed the Global Tiger 
Recovery Programme, an action plan to double tiger popula-
tions by 2022, strengthen reserves, crack down on poachers 
and provide financial incentives to maintain a thriving tiger 
population.40 INTERPOL has together with the member states 
provided recommendations for the protection of the species. 
However, in order to protect the tiger, not only is an interna-
tional effort required. Frontline protection, consumer aware-
ness and especially habitat protection is imperative. Hence, 
a broad approach will be required in order to ensure the 
survival of tigers. For some of the populations, the situation 
is so acute that immediate frontline protection is critical and 
urgently needed.
domestic trade in tiger bones and their derivatives to help 
implement the international tiger trade ban already in place 
under CITES. China’s 1993 ban closed down a significant 
legal industry in tiger bones and medicines made from tiger 




Sturgeon poaching in the Northern Caspian
Since 1998, international trade in all species of sturgeon 
has been regulated under CITES owing to concerns over 
the impact of unsustainable harvesting of and illegal trade 
in sturgeon populations in the wild. The situation in the 
Caspian Sea, where most of the world’s caviar is produced, 
became particularly worrying after the dissolution of the 
USSR, which led to the virtual collapse of existing manage-
ment and control systems. These northern hemisphere fish 
stocks can be found in large river systems, lakes, coastal 
waters and inner seas throughout Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, 
China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kazakhstan, Romania, 
the Russian Federation, Turkmenistan, Turkey, Ukraine, 
other European countries and North America. For people 
around the world, caviar, i.e. unfertilized sturgeon roe, is a 
delicacy. For the range States, sturgeon is a major source of 
income and employment, as well as an important element 
in the local food supply. Current trends in illegal harvest and 
trade put all these benefits at risk.
The Caspian and Azov seas contain more than 90% of world 
sturgeon fish stocks. Sturgeon is among the world’s most valu-
able wildlife resources.41 Commercial stocks in the Caspian 
Sea basin include the Russian (Acipenser gueldenstaedtii) 
and Persian (Acipenser persicus) sturgeon, stellate sturgeon 
(Acipenser stellatus), beluga (Huso huso) and sterlet (Acipenser 
ruthenus); Azov basin – stellate sturgeon, beluga and Russian 
sturgeon – altogether 11 species of sturgeon.42
Figure 7: The sturgeon – sought for its caviar – has declined dramatically in what is now a heavily illegal trade. To reduce the illicit 
trade in any wildlife, responses must include frontline protection, customs control, investigation and prosecution of networks 
and targeted consumer awareness programmes as well as general awareness to the local populations on the threats posed to 
their local economy, food security and sustainability.
CASE STUDY
Sturgeon poaching in Dagestan
In Russia, the sturgeon poaching in the Republic of 
Dagestan has reached unprecedented proportions, with 
a significant share of the coastal population engaged in 
this activity, including through corruption. 
Poaching is often done by individuals on motor fishing 
boats. The monthly “income” of local police and fish 
inspectors in bribes has been estimated around USD 
800 per motor boat. The catch is collected by a “master” 
who controls the coastal sea fishing and fish processing.
However the most damaging poaching is the “commer-
cial” one using trawlers. 
On average, one illegal catch brings around 170,000 
roubles (USD 5,000) in profit. This is an extremely high 
level of earnings in Dagestan, which remains one of the 
poorest regions in Russia.47 In the first half of 2010 in 
the Republic of Dagestan there have been 300 regis-
tered criminal cases under Article 256 of the Criminal 
Code (illegal harvesting of aquatic biological resources) 
and Article 175 (purchase or sale of property, knowingly 
obtained through criminal activity). Only 4 criminal cases 
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Source: TRAFFIC, Europe, 5th International Symposium on Sturgeon.
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According to the Caspian Research Institute of Fisheries the 
population of sturgeon in the Caspian Sea in 2004 included: 
5 million beluga, 7 million stellate sturgeon, and 36 million 
sturgeon. However, this data was questioned by CITES, that 
considers it inflated. Sturgeon stocks in the Far East are 
considerably smaller.43
It is estimated by the office of the Prosecutor General of 
Kazakhstan, that during the decade from 2002 to 2012 the 
sturgeon population in the Ural-Caspian region declined by 
98 % (from 61 million to 1.3 million). For the last two years 
alone it has dropped by two million (from 3,3 million in 2010 
to 1,3 million in 2012).44
According to official statistics, Russia produced around 16 tons 
of caviar in 2012. This is down by 2 tons (11%) from 2011, and 
down by 8 tons since 2001 (24 tons). In 2002, Russia banned 
the sale of sturgeon caviar harvested in the Caspian Sea and 
Volga due to increased poaching and a drastically declining 
population of the fish. In 2007, when sturgeon was facing 
extinction in its native habitat, Russia completely banned wild 
sturgeon harvesting under the pressure of different interna-
tional organizations. The ban has been joined by all Caspian 
littoral states in 2014. From the largest exporter (41 tons in 
2001) Russia became an importer of caviar. In 2012 it imported 
8,8 tons and exported only 6,2 tons. Today 100% of legally 
produced sturgeon caviar is harvested in aqua farms. However, 
according to experts, despite the ban the volume of illegal stur-
geon caviar exceeds its legal production 10 times. Estimates 
show that between 90% and 98% of sturgeon caviar sold on 
the Russian market comes from poachers.45 Other experts 
consider the domestic market even bigger, up to 100–150 tons. 
Contraband imports come mostly from Armenia.46
The low standard of living in some coastal regions of Russia 
makes the financial rewards from organized crime attractive. 
The organization of law enforcement, with extremely low 
staffing, low level of fisheries inspections, and low wages are 
other contributing factors.
In 2013 347 crimes related to sturgeon poaching were regis-
tered in Kazakhstan over a period of 10 months, showing 
40% increase compared to 2012. During 2012–13 only 466 
of the 991 criminal cases related to sturgeon poaching have 
been brought to court.
The main measures for conservation of sturgeon in the 
Northern Caspian are reduction of illegal fishing, introduc-
tion of universal labelling system for sturgeon products and 
reclaiming the water bodies through enforcement. 
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In Latin America, a range of 
wildlife is being illegally hunted 
and traded, including birds, 
fish, turtles, river dolphins, 
wild cats and even butterflies.
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Rosewood, mahogany and African cherry49 
Prunus africana, commonly known as the African cherry, is 
a tree from the mountain areas of tropical Africa and Mada-
gascar. It is harvested for its bark, which has medicinal prop-
erties, and timber. In July 2006, a CITES Plants Committee 
categorized the populations of Prunus africana from Burundi, 
Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equato-
rial Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar and the United Republic of 
Tanzania as ‘of urgent concern’. 
The big leaf mahogany (Swietenia macrophylla), is a tree endemic 
to the Neotropics that can grow up to 45 m in height and 2 m 
in trunk diameter. It is harvested for its highly valued timber 
to make furniture, panelling or musical instruments, and has 
been widely planted outside its historical range. Thus Fiji, Bang-
ladesh, India, Indonesia and the Philippines are now major 
exporters of plantation-grown timber. Meanwhile, however, 
original wild populations have declined significantly and timber 
from the Neotropics (specifically logs, sawnwood, veneer 
sheets and plywood) is currently included in CITES Appendix 
II. A series of country reports from Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Peru, Dominican Republic, as well as between ITTO and CITES 
address the illegal trade and conservation challenge.
Most plant and tree species tend to have much lower frontline 
protection than the iconic wildlife species. Forest reserves 
without major wildlife species are even more understaffed 
in terms of frontline protection. In many cases, as is seen 
in Southeast Asia, Latin America and in Africa, endangered 
and rare, but highly valuable wood species are being smug-
gled. The UNODC-WCO container programme, CITES 
and INTERPOL are increasingly addressing this serious, 
but high value trade. The container programme has made 
several seizures.
There is currently a severe lack of investigations and official 
reporting on the many high-value wood species. Rosewood 
(Dalbergia sp.) in particular is being harvested illegally on a 
large scale, including in Madagascar and Eastern Africa, as 
well as in Southeast Asia, and smuggled across borders and 
traded. The species is distributed in tropical areas of Africa 
(five species), Latin America (seven species) and Asia (21 
species). Of these 33 species, six are listed in the Convention 
on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora (CITES): D. caerensis (CITES Appendix I), P. santa-
linus and D. cochinchinensis (CITES Appendix II), D. retusa, D. 
stevensonii and D. louvelii (CITES Appendix III), all of which 
are popular species in the Chinese market.50
The Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA) has reported 
trade in Rosewood as rising, with over USD 3 billion spent on 
rosewood in Vietnam alone. Unprocessed rosewood has been 
claimed to fetch over USD 50,000 per m3.51
Other reports have documented a range of prices.52 “Collect-
able” rosewoods, D. odorifera and D. tonkinensis praion are 
allegedly sold at very high market prices (ca. USD 2 million 
per m3). P. santalinus also has a long history of use in 
China, and due to restrictive export policies in India supply 
is limited, so it has a high market price in China of around 
USD 150,000 per m3. High-end species such as D. louvelii, 
D. cochinchinensis and D. retusa are very popular for rose-
wood furniture, fetching prices of around USD 40,000, 
USD 20,000 and USD 10,000 per m3, respectively. Mid-market 
species are mainly from Southeast Asia and prices are around 
USD 2,000 to 3,000 per m3. Rarity is not the driving force of 
price determination. Low-end species are mainly from Africa 
and average prices are below USD 1,500 per m3. The market 
was claimed to be moderate, with steady price increases from 
2000 to 2005. The price of high-end rosewood has been rising 
significantly since 2006. For example, before 2005, D. odor-
ifera was available on the ordinary market at a price below 
USD 15,000 per m3. The price rose to over USD 100,000 
in 2006, USD 500,000 in 2007 and is now around 
USD 1.5 million per m3. The 2012 price of D. cochinchinensis, 
USD 15,000, was 15 times higher than its price in 2005. 
While numbers are unconfirmed, it is in accordance with a 
general pattern that illicit wood resources are worth consid-
erably higher monetary value than wildlife in most cases. 
Moreover, the trade carries much lower risk, as the wood is 
often not considered contraband. It is easily mixed with legal 
products during transport, transported in the open, and there 




Exploitation of natural resources during conflicts
Parks, biodiversity hotspots, and other vulnerable habitats are 
increasingly being exploited by poachers, including a range of 
militias and other non-state armed groups. These groups raise 
funds through the exploitation of wildlife resources including 
ivory, rhinoceros horn, tiger pelts, shahtoosh (wool from the 
Chiru or Tibetan antelope (Pantholops hodgsonii), and timber. 
Throughout Central and Southern Africa, armed groups capi-
talize on poaching and timber exploitation to fuel a variety of 
armed movements. The Sudanese Janjaweed and the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA) poach elephants throughout Central 
Africa and neighboring countries. Dozens of militia groups kill 
elephants and hippopotamuses, harvest timber, and produce or 
tax charcoal, all to finance conflict in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo and in neighboring countries. The Mozambican 
National Resistance (RENAMO) has been accused of poaching 
elephants and rhinos to fund their resurgent insurgency.53 
Likewise in Asia, exploitation of wildlife supports a number 
of non-state armed groups. Al Qaeda affiliated local Bangla-
deshi separatists and other tribal militias in India have been 
reported to be implicated in the illegal trade in ivory, tiger 
pelts, and rhino horns in Southeast Asia.54 Al Qaeda and the 
Haqqani network have been accused of raising funds through 
timber exploitation and trade.55
Despite the increased awareness of the connections between 
wildlife crime and threat finance this is not a new phenom-
enon. Criminals may also exploit ongoing conflicts, blaming 
fighting parties for the poaching, or the other way around. Typi-
cally, armed militias try to take control over valuable natural 
resources in their territory and will fiercely oppose anyone 
interfering or competing. However, the farther other poachers 
or criminals are from the centre of conflict zones, the more 
likely is the probability that they will blame the illegal exploita-
tion of natural resources also on fighting parties, especially as 
terrorists and militias are unlikely to counter the accusations.
As many as 40% of intrastate conflicts over the past sixty 
years have been linked to natural resources.56 Of the 34 biodi-
versity hotpots identified across the world, 80% saw signifi-
cant conflict during roughly the same period.57 In the 1970s, 
over 100,000 elephants were allegedly killed to fund civil 
wars in Angola and Mozambique.58 Charles Taylor utilized 
timber as a key source of funding in all phases of Liberia’s 
civil war.59 Timber resources helped fund the Khmer Rouge 
in Cambodia, and played a role in conflicts in Burma, Cote 
d’Ivoire, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.60
 
Armed groups make money through: direct control of 
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to corporations in return for money, weapons and equip-
ment; taxation of roads and transport through militia-held 
territory; organized poaching of high-value species such as 
elephants and rhinos; and opportunistic harvesting of wild-
life. For a group like the LRA, with limited opportunities to 
tax resources, ivory can be an important source of revenue, 
and perhaps provide one of the only means for the group to 
survive. In the worst cases, resources become the raison d’etre 
for conflict, replacing the complex social, economic, cultural 
and ethnic factors as the primary reason to continue to fight.61 
Such “resource wars” stem from “armed conflict in which 
the control and revenue of natural resources are significantly 
involved in the economy of the conflict and/or the motiva-
tions of the belligerents.”62
The illegal extraction of natural resources by armed groups 
militarizes ecologically important and sensitive areas. 
Among the consequences of this abuse are the reduced 
potential for conservation, contributing to the permanent 
destruction of wildlife resources and keystone species, and 
the creation of conditions leading to severe human rights 
abuses. In the short term, large-scale environmental crime 
threatens human populations located close to valuable wild-
life resources. The destruction of natural resources exacer-
bates inter-communal violence, fuels crime and corruption, 
and instability. Small arms and light weapons proliferate 
in areas targeted by armed groups. They are used to kill 
animals and wildlife rangers and anti-poaching forces, as 
well as to threaten and harass local community members 
in the commission of other crimes.64 Local communities are 
subject to threats, intimidation, forced labour, child soldier 
recruitment, human trafficking, sex slavery, mass rapes/
sexual exploitation, and murder. In the long term the conver-
gence between armed groups and the transnational criminal 
networks required to move wildlife products to international 
markets breeds corruption,65 undermines the rule of law, 
impacts the ability of states to raise revenue through taxation 
and extraction, and destroys local economies.66
Non-state armed groups require funding for operations, 
raised through some sort of sponsorship and formal rela-
tionship or through ‘self-financing,’ often achieved by the 
exploitation of natural resources.67 Conflict zones provide the 
cover of instability for transnational criminal organizations 
to operate and provide opportunities for collusion with both 
corrupt state officials and non-state armed groups.68 The war 
economies, which emerge in conflict zones, connect transna-
tional criminal organizations, militias, terrorists, and other 
non-state armed groups into cross-border networks to move 
valuable resources into international markets. This creates 
the logic for convergence with terrorist and other non-state 
armed groups. Neither have any incentive to contribute to 
conflict resolution or restoring peace, stability, or govern-
ance to an area. 
Park rangers and eco-guards protecting wildlife resources 
face heavily armed, militarily experienced actors who assault 
park infrastructure, staff, and wildlife, harass and intimidate 
local populations, and engage in deliberate destruction of the 
environment. Targeted attacks are known to occur in response 
to the disruption of illegal activities by park staff including 
investigations into poaching, illegal charcoal production, 
and illegal mining activities. Rangers in particular are under 
threat, with over 1,000 across 35 countries killed in the last 
decade.69 Armed groups have been reported to torture and kill 
park personnel charged with protecting wildlife resources.70
Once state and non-state armed groups begin harvesting 
resources and realizing the profits from exploitation, the 
resources become a key factor in sustaining and prolonging 
Figure 8: Around the world, conflicts and 
wars are taking a toll on forests and on 
the communities that rely on them for 
their livelihood. Dense forests can serve 
as hideouts for insurgent groups or can 
be a vital source of revenue for warring 
parties to sustain conflicty.63
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CASE STUDY
India: Great One-Horned Rhinoceros
Assam, in India, holds 75% of the world’s remaining 
great one-horned rhinoceroses in three protected areas, 
Kaziranga, Orang, and Pabitora. Of the three, Kaziranga’s 
rhino population is the largest, with over 2,000 animals. 
These rhinos represent a remarkable conservation success 
story. At the turn of the nineteenth century, it was thought 
less than 50 one-horned rhinoceros remained in India. 
Kaziranga housed just 12. Today the park, a World Heritage 
Site and Biodiversity Hotspot, also boasts healthy popula-
tions of Royal Bengal tiger, elephant, buffalo, and swamp 
deer. These animals are all under threat from habitat degra-
dation and loss, road and train traffic accidents, human-an-
imal conflicts, and periodic flooding. Poaching associated 
with armed militant groups began rising in 2007 with the 
killing of 18 rhinos. 
Two other parks in the region lost their rhinos as the 
result of conflict-driven poaching in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Today a multitude of armed groups including tribal 
separatists, rebels, and Islamist terrorists poach within 
Kaziranga and in adjacent areas.86 Almost two dozen mili-
tant organizations are active in the region, proliferating 
arms and impacting security, and creating opportunities 
for the penetration of transnational organized crime.87 
Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami and Jama’atul Mujahideen Bang-
ladesh, Bangladeshi terror groups affiliated with Al Qaeda, 
reportedly poach tigers, elephants, and rhino in the park 
to raise organizational operating funds. The groups have 
been claimed to be linked with criminal syndicates in 
Nepal, Thailand, and China.88 The Karbi Peoples’ Libera-
tion Tigers (KPLT) sponsor and organize hunts, arming 
poachers with AK-47s to kill rhinos to extract their horns 
and to battle forest guards.89 After being apprehended 
in the act, one member of the Kuki National Liberation 
Front admitted killing six rhinos.90 At least 41 rhinos were 
poached in Kaziranga in 2013, double the number killed 
the previous year. Most were reportedly killed by AK-47s 
and .303 rifles used by militant groups.91
The horns are traded for weapons and cash to fund militant 
activities. The involvement of armed militias in poaching 
elevates the risks associated with guarding the park’s 
animals. Forest guards now openly engage in combat with 
militant groups, despite their limited equipment, training, 
and low pay.92
Kaziranga officials try to protect the animals through 
strong anti-poaching initiatives with over 150 security 
posts throughout the park, deployment of the elite Assam 
Forest Protection Force, tight local intelligence networks, 
and rewards to informants. Scores of poachers are arrested 
each year, and rangers regularly risk their lives pursuing 
and fighting the militants. However, limited law enforce-
ment, challenges of coordination between forestry offi-
cials and the judiciary, suspected corruption within the 
department93 as well as poor working conditions, limited 
training, and lack of equipment for the guards create chal-




Forest covers as much as 45% of Liberia’s land area, making 
it one of the last remaining countries in West Africa with 
extensive forest coverage.95 During the country’s nearly 
two decades of conflict, the valuable timber extracted from 
those forests became known as ‘blood timber’ or ‘conflict 
timber’ by groups such as Global Witness, similar to the 
term ‘blood diamonds’.96 The timber is moved from conflict 
zones to international markets through collusion between 
militias and transnational criminal networks involved in 
the timber industry.97
Former president of Liberia, Charles Taylor, allegedly 
utilized funds from the extraction of timber (and other 
natural resources, most famously diamonds) to take over 
the country, support the Revolutionary United Front’s 
violent rebellion in Sierra Leone, and support rebels in 
western Ivory Coast.98 During the first civil war from 1989-
1996, timber became the primary source of independent 
funding for his National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL).99 
During the second civil war, Taylor worked closely with 
international timber trading companies to manage his 
concessions, making deals to trade timber for weapons, 
helicopters, uniforms, vehicles, and other equipment 
to continue his rebel movement.100 In countries at war, 
logging companies may sometimes side with groups 
controlling forest territories, including rebels and insur-
gents.101 Timber companies may act as middle-men with 
international arms dealers, including the convicted arms 
trader Victor Bout, in transporting arms and facilitating 
payments.102 These arms deals were in direct violation of 
the 1992 UN Security Council Resolution 788 and subse-
quent resolutions, which established an arms embargo on 
Liberia.103 In some cases, timber companies paid the taxes 
owed to the Liberian government directly to arms dealers 
on the government’s behalf in exchange for weapons. In 
many cases these companies appear to have worked closely 
with ex-generals and other members of Taylor’s military to 
run timber concessions, including through recruitments of 
militias to protect the concessions or support the existing 
political powers.104 The timber industry has been estimated 
to bring in USD 80–100 million dollars per year during 
much of this period, with less than 10% reaching the tax 
authorities.105 These funds allowed for the extension and 
expansion of the conflict, which resulted in the deaths of 
over 250,000 people, caused millions to be displaced from 
their homes, and destroyed the country’s economy.
conflict.71 Conflicts involving natural resources last longer 
and have a greater chance of reigniting after resolution than 
other types of conflicts.72 When profit motives overtake polit-
ical goals, resources become a means for predation and accu-
mulation. Under such conditions groups will even work with 
supposed enemies to exploit resources, regardless of alliances 
and affiliations.73 At the same time, contests over control of 
resources can fragment groups and erode hierarchies, organ-
izational structures, and command and control mechanisms. 
This often results in a proliferation of armed groups in violent 
competition.74 Insurgencies and lucrative war economies may 
also become linked to transnational criminal networks.75 
These networks stretch into all segments of society and across 
international borders, implicating foreign political leaders, 
opposing militaries, businessmen and women, customs and 
border control agents, and even wildlife conservation profes-
sionals in the illegal exploitation of wildlife.76 The entrenched 
networks and war economies created during conflict extend 
to regional and international illicit economies.77 These groups 
become invested in the exploitation of resources, only made 
possible under the cover of conflict and instability.
Once entrenched in war economies groups involved in the 
illegal extraction of resources lack incentives to negotiate 
or maintain peace. Self-financed and well connected, these 
groups are often less vulnerable to external control or pres-
sure.78 Belligerents who do not want to lose exclusive access 
to valuable profit-making natural resources undermine peace 
agreements. They are also often fragmented, making the task 
of bringing all relevant groups to the negotiating table difficult 
to surmount.79 Combatants look to their weapons as essen-
tial economic assets after years of resource predation and are 
often unwilling to surrender them under DDR agreements.80 
In particular, the economic opportunities and rewards in 
the illicit economy and within war economies often outstrip 
those available in a post-conflict environment, influencing the 
decisions of individuals and groups to lay down arms.81 “War 
economies destroy local infrastructure and decimate local 
human, financial, and institutional resources.”82
Even after peace agreements are in place, armed groups, 
cross-border trading networks, and criminals engaged in 
economic exploitation during conflict tend to continue their 
self-enrichment activities post-conflict.83 Former belligerents 
serve as a ready pool for transnational crime, transforming 
into what are essentially criminal gangs in order to continue 
participating in the illicit economy.84 Building a functioning 
licit economy in the shadows of large-scale criminal resource 
extraction is an almost insurmountable challenge, further 
diminishing chances for long-term peace and stability and 
thus undermine measures for environmental sustainability 





Democratic Republic of Congo: Illegal exploitation of natural resources
The DRC is rated by CITES as one of the two most prob-
lematic countries in Africa for illegal exploitation of natural 
resources, from ivory to elephants. In some sites in the 
country, 90% of elephant carcasses discovered had been 
poached.106 Ivory is considered to be hunted and traded by 
militants for weapons, ammunition, food, and other mate-
rials required to sustain insurgent movements. The Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA), Janjaweed, the Democratic Forces 
for the Defence of Rwanda (FDLR), Mai-Mai Morgan, and 
various local armed militias regularly poach elephants and 
hippos for ivory in the DRC. Many of these same groups 
are directly implicated in illicit timber, charcoal, gold, and 
mineral trades and have been connected to serious human 
rights abuses including mass murder, recruitment of child 
soldiers, kidnapping, forced labour, sex slavery, mass looting, 
and displacement. These armed groups hunt elephants by 
organizing and supplying locals to hunt the animals. Impor-
tantly, ivory is a commodity available to lower level fighters 
who are unable to benefit from more lucrative taxation 
schemes controlled by militant group leaders. 
Garamba National Park is located along the northern border 
with South Sudan. The LRA and Sudanese poaching gangs 
use it actively, and local poachers who operate with impunity 
in the insecure environment, also blame the militias. Most 
of Garamba is too dangerous to patrol. Park rangers can only 
conduct foot patrols in the southern third of the park, south of 
the Garamba River.107 By 2013 the park’s population of 22,000 
elephants had decreased by 90% to around 2,000 animals. 
The park was home to the last wild populations of Northern 
White Rhinoceros in the world before being poached to 
extinction in the 2000s by Sudanese poaching gangs, possibly 
Janjaweed.108 Travelling in gangs of dozens of hunters and 
porters, the Sudanese poachers, typically armed with AK-47s, 
poach elephants in and around the park.109 The LRA, operating 
on direct orders from their leader Joseph Kony, hunt elephants 
in order to trade ivory to transnational criminal groups for 
guns, ammunitions, food, and other supplies. In 2009, the 
group attacked the park headquarters, killing 17 of the park’s 
staff.110 Ugandan forces linked caches of tusks found in the 
Central African Republic CAR to the LRA.111
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Virunga National Park, on the border with Uganda and 
Rwanda, was severely impacted by the Rwandan genocide and 
on-going refugee crisis. It served as the battleground in the 
Kivu War and continues to support multiple armed groups 
who exploit the park’s forest and wildlife resources. The 
multitude of military groups operating in this region makes 
Virunga one of the most dangerous parks in the DRC. The 
groups include the FDLR, URDC, various Mai-Mai groups, 
and, until their disbandment in 2013, the M23. The charcoal 
trade is one of many lucrative illicit trades in the park, which 
also include timber extraction, gold mining, and marijuana 
cultivation.112 Nearly two hundred rangers have been killed in 
the park since 1996. In 2008, the rangers’ headquarters in 
the park was attacked by National Congress for the Defence 
of the People (CNDP) militants. One year earlier, militants 
murdered seven of the park’s endangered Mountain gorillas 
in retaliation for attempts to disrupt illicit production and 
trade of charcoal and timber.113 The FDLR controls portions 
of the park and regularly conduct operations from the area. 
Since 2011 the FDLR have been responsible for the deaths 
of 20 rangers in the park. The latest attack, carried out in 
January 2014, killed one ranger and injured two others.114 
News reports suggest the attack was revenge for increased 
patrolling of charcoal production areas.115 The Okapi Wildlife 
Reserve lies within the Ituri forest in north-east DRC, near the 
borders with South Sudan and Uganda. The site is infamous 
for a particularly destructive attack by Mai-Mai “Morgan” in 
2012. Mai-Mai Morgan poaches elephants, mines for gold 
and other materials in the park, and has committed serious 
human rights abuses including forced porterage, mass rape, 
kidnapping for ransom, sex slavery, and murder.116 The group 
attacked the park headquarters killing at least three people 
and 14 highly endangered okapi in revenge for rangers’ efforts 
to disrupt their illegal activities in the park.117
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Figure 9: Illegal logging directly fuels many conflicts, as timber is a resource available for conflict profiteers or to finance arms 
sales. Without public order, militants, guerrillas or military units impose taxes on logging companies or charcoal producers, 
issue false export permits and control border points. They frequently demand the removal of all vehicle checkpoints and public 
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The scale of revenue from wildlife crime is dwarfed by the income from illegal 
logging and forest crime. Forest crime, such as illegal logging, has previously been 
estimated to represent a value of 30–100 billion USD annually or 10–30% of the 
total global timber trade. An estimated 50–90% of the all the wood in some indi-
vidual tropical countries is suspected to come from illegal sources or has been 
logged illegally. Forest crime appears to take place in four forms: 1) illegal exploita-
tion of high-value endangered (CITES listed) wood species, including rosewood 
and mahogany; 2) illegal logging of timber for sawnwood, building material and 
furniture; 3) illegal logging and laundering of wood through plantation and agri-
cultural front companies to supply pulp for the paper industry; and 4) utilization 
of the vastly unregulated woodfuel and charcoal trade to conceal illegal logging in 
and outside protected areas, conduct extensive tax evasion and fraud, and supply 
fuel through the informal sector.
Forest crime
The illegal trade and exploitation in flora, such as illegal logging, 
has been estimated to represent a value of 30–100 billion USD 
annually. This equals 10–30% of the total global timber trade.118 
An estimated 50–90% of the wood in some tropical countries 
is suspected to come from illegal sources or has been logged 
illegally.119 In addition to the illegal trade in harvested wild 
plants for ornamental and medicinal purposes, the illegal trade 
in flora appears to take place in four main forms: 
1. The illegal exploitation of high-value endangered wood 
species, including rosewood and mahogany (many of 
which are now CITES listed)
2. Illegal logging of timber for sawnwood, building material 
and furniture 
3. Illegal logging and laundering of wood through planta-
tion and agricultural front companies to supply pulp for 
the paper industry
4. Utilization of the vastly unregulated woodfuel and 
charcoal trade to conceal illegal logging in and outside 
protected areas, conduct extensive tax evasion and fraud, 
and supply fuel through the informal sector.
Trafficking and smuggling of endangered CITES-listed 
species such as Rosewood (Dalbergia sp.) and some species of 
Mahogany involve organized crime in both harvesting and in 
distribution through large trans-oceanic shipments.120 Most 
illegally sourced and traded wood is either not considered or 
recognized as contraband by customs, or falsely declared as 
legally sourced and traded wood, or mixed inside paper and 
pulp. Over thirty different ways of conducting illegal logging 
and laundering timber are identified. Primary methods 
include falsification of logging permits, bribes to obtain 
logging permits (in some instances noted as USD 20–50,000 
per permit), logging beyond concessions, hacking govern-
ment websites to obtain transport permits for higher volumes 
or transport, laundering illegal timber by establishing roads, 
ranches, palm oil or forest plantations and mixing with legal 
timber during transport or in mills. Funnelling large volumes 
of illegal timber through legal plantations, across borders or 
through mills, is another effective way to launder logs. In 
some instances illegal loggers mix illicit timber with 3–30 
times the amount of officially processed timber, which also 
constitutes tax fraud. Many of these illegal operations involve 
bribes to forest officials, police and military, and even royalties 
to local village heads.121
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Figure 10: Ten ways to conduct illegal logging.
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For pulp and paper production, networks of shell companies 
and plantations are actively used to by-pass logging mora-
toriums under the pretext of agricultural or palm-oil invest-
ments. Holding companies in tax havens and shell compa-
nies are actively used to deliberately and systematically 
bypass logging moratoriums for alleged plantation devel-
opment and hide the real ownership of plantations to avoid 
prosecution. Often these plantations or agricultural develop-
ment are never established, or they are declared bankrupt 
following clearing. This results in significant loss of revenue 
to governments. Perpetrators use legal loopholes to conduct 
tax avoidance, or simply commit straightforward illegal tax 
evasion. Plantations are also used as cover for larger networks 
of forest logging roads. The road networks are used to funnel 
illegal timber through plantations, or to ship wood and pulp 
via legal plantations in order to re-classify pulp or wood as 
legal production.122
China is now the world’s largest consumer of tropical timber 
(ITTO 2011), and increasing. Significant efforts are made 
in China to establish plantations, however China’s wood 
industry depends on imports for almost 50% of its timber 
supply. Sourcing of materials for this large and growing 
market is crucial to the long-term sustainability of the 
industry in China and of forest resources and wood indus-
tries around the globe.124
Figure 11: Wood and wood products from tropical countries to Europe and United States.
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Wood and wood products from tropical countries* 
to Europe and United States
* Selected tropical countries: Brazil, Chile, China, Indonesia, Philippines, South Africa, and Uruguay
The scope of illegal logging can be deduced from assessing 
the amount of tropical wood out of all the wood products 
imported to the EU and US. About 33.5 million m3 round 
wood equivalent (RWE), or 9–25%, originates in tropical 
countries, where illegal logging is widespread.
According to data from EUROSTAT, FAO and ITTO for 
2010, EU imports 133–385 million m3 RWE of wood products 
including paper and pulp. The US imports about 72 million 
m3. About 59 per cent of the imports to the EU and the US are 
paper and pulp. From tropical countries the relative amount of 
paper and pulp is higher, at 62% for US and 86% of imports 
to the EU. 
About 60 million tons of paper and pulp (RWE of 186 million 
m3) was imported to the US and the EU combined in 2010. 
EU imports 2/3 of the paper, and US and EU import the same 
amount of pulp. 15% of this is sourced in tropical countries. 
Paper and pulp are interesting products from a transnational 
organized crime perspective because once it has been processed 
it takes scientific analysis of fibre samples to determine its 
origins, in contrast to roundwood where species and origins 
can more easily be identified. This makes laundering of parts of 
the supply chain effective, and retracing of the product imprac-
tical and expensive. The wood used to produce paper and pulp 
is often mostly or partly declared falsely as plantation wood.125
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Asia produced 212 million tons of paper and pulp in 
2012.126 About 29% of roundwood officially imported in Asia 
is tropical.127
It is estimated that the combined production capacity of the 
five largest paper and pulp conglomerates is about 63 million 
tons pulp and paper.128 At a typical 84% productivity, these 
companies would have produced 53 million tons, or 24% of 
the total paper and pulp produced in Asia.129 UNODC has 
estimated that 30–40% of wood-based exports, valued at 
USD 17 billion, from the region in 2010 originated in illegal 
sources. This is also corroborated by other sources.130 Out of 
these USD 17 billion, about 6 billion are paper and pulp prod-
ucts, and 11 billion are timber products.
China’s paper and pulp mills had in 2010 a total capacity of 
about 58 million tons of pulp, and 82 million tons of paper 
(106 million tons of paper and paperboard in 2012 according 
to FAOSTAT).131 This equates to a roundwood equivalent of 
220 million m3 for pulp and 204 million m3 for paper.132 About 
84% of production capacity is typically utilized.133 According 
to FAO statistics, in 2010 China produced 143 million m3 
of industrial roundwood, and imported 42 million m3. 19% of 
the imports were tropical.134 A significant share is explained by 
use of recycled paper and non-wood pulp sources. However, 
analysis suggests that there are still major discrepancies 
between the total pulp consumption (from all sources) and 
the produced and exported amount of paper.134 Furthermore 
there are also major discrepancies between FAO estimates 
and those from the industry, with particular regard to official 
exports and consumption of pulp.134 
The production of paper, wood chips and pulp is done mainly 
in Brazil, Indonesia, Chile, Japan, Thailand, China and South 
Korea. This includes large shares of wood originating across 
the Amazon and Southeast Asia, of which 50–90% is consid-
ered illegal.135 The value of illegal logging has been estimated 
by UNEP to be in the range of USD 25–95 billion.136 Ille-
gality refers to both the process of logging in areas that are 
protected, and to the trade in illegal forest products. 
The trade in illegal forest products is integrated in the formal 
legitimate trade, using the latter’s logistical channels. Large-scale 
corruption is the glue that binds the legal and the illegal trade 
closer together. UNODC in particular note the importance of free-
trade ports like Singapore and Hong Kong, effectively becoming 
consolidation hubs for illegal and legal forest products.137
These methods effectively by-pass many current customs efforts 
related to the United States of America’s Lacey Act and the Euro-
pean Union’s FLEGT138 programme to restrict the import of 
illegal tropical wood to the US and to the EU respectively. Based 
on data from EUROSTAT, FAO and the ITTO, the EU and the 
US annually import approximately 33.5 million tons of tropical 
wood in all its forms. It is estimated that 62–86% of all suspected 
illegal tropical wood entering the EU and US arrives in the form 
of paper, pulp or wood chips, not as round-wood or sawn-wood 
or furniture products,139 which have received the most attention 
in the past. Often these processed products are then mixed with 
legal products to hide the origin, with substantial profits and 
competition benefits, depressing the prices and incomes for 
sustainable industries. Such practices form a special challenge 
to certification schemes and consumer awareness.
Logging and palm oil conglomerate sentenced to pay USD 205 million in Indonesia’s largest 
tax evasion case
In the biggest tax evasion case in Indonesian history, the 
Indonesian Supreme Court in December 2012 ruled that 
the forestry, rubber and palm oil plantation conglomerate 
Royal Eagle International had to pay USD 205 million in 
owed taxes, and fines. The tax evasion totaled USD 112 
million, and the remaining USD 93 million constituted 
a fine. The company paid the owed taxes, but refused to 
pay the fine. The Indonesian Attorney General’s Office 
had to threaten asset seizures, including 165,000 hectares 
of plantation land in Riau and North Sumatra, before the 
company yielded and paid the fine. 
Court documents show how palm oil subsidiary Asian 
Agri was operating. The company used transfer pricing, 
selling vast amounts of palm oil at artificially low prices 
to fictitious off shore affiliates, including at the British 
Virgin Islands. These affiliates in turn sold the goods to 
real buyers. In the process the company avoided higher 
taxes in Indonesia. In two specific cases described by 
the court documents 3,500 tons of palm oil was sold to 
fictitious companies, and then on to real ones, netting a 
profit of more than USD 180,000. The case also involved 
manufacture of fake invoices and hedging contracts. 
Asian Agri is a sister company of paper and pulp giant 
APRIL, which is one of the five largest paper and pulp 
companies in Asia/Pacific. 
While the perpetrators of illegal logging vary across 
different regions, in South East Asia large industrial 
conglomerates involved in timber and palm oil produc-
tion largely drive the illegal logging. A common situation 
is that these companies have run out of legal production 
forest, or that they are clearing forest to expand palm oil 
plantations. The double income source that timber and 
new plantations provide makes it difficult to combat illegal 
logging in this area.123
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The special challenge of illegal trade in wood­
fuel and charcoal
Official estimates by the FAO suggest that just under half 
of tropical wood consumption in Asia (range 36–98%), and 
in Latin America (range 8–85%) is used for woodfuel.140 The 
remaining half in both regions is divided into sawnwood and 
pulp for the paper industry, and other products. Charcoal 
and pulp are particularly subject to exploitation by criminals.
In Africa 90% of wood consumed is estimated used for 
woodfuel and charcoal (East Africa 94%, North Africa 96%, 
Central Africa 87%, South Africa 49%, West Africa 92%).141 
In Asia woodfuel is 70% of all wood, and in the world 53%.142 
Africa has an official charcoal production of 30.6 million 
tons in 2012, worth approximately USD 6.1–24.5 billion 
annually at the point of sale.143 The total export number 
for Africa is only 1.4 percent of production.144 Such a low 
figure is unrealistically small, considering the key impor-
tance of charcoal in African local energy consumption, and 
its related widespread trade. The relative export percentages 
of other products indicate how unusually small the official 
charcoal export figures are. Industrial roundwood export is 
5% of production, sawnwood is 28%, and paper and pulp 
combined is 16%. Indeed, the official exports of charcoal 
from most African countries amount only to a few truck-
loads annually cross-border.
Figure 13: Current population projections by UN’s Population 
Division suggest an increase from the current ca. 0.9 billion 
to 2.1 billion people by 2050 in Sub-Saharan Africa. The UN 
further estimates the urbanization for Sub-Saharan Africa, 
currently at 38 percent, to increase to 56.5 percent in 2050. 
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Source: UNDESA, Population on-line database, accessed 23-02-20010
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Kenyan Police Corporal celebrated by Kenyan 
Forest Service and Kenyan Wildlife Service 
for integrity and services to conservation
Corporal David Chumo is a police officer at Ntulele 
Police Station in Narok County, Kenya, who has declined 
repeated offers of bribes from traffickers of wildlife and 
charcoal. Chumo has instead of taking bribes made a 
series of arrests for wildlife and forest crimes. 
Chumo’s arrests include that of a trafficker carrying 840 
kg of giraffe meat in January 2013; a charcoal transport in 
July 2013; and five people ferrying charcoal in September 
2013. These arrests came after Kenya Wildlife Service 
celebrated Chumo for turning down a bribe and instead 
arresting a trafficker of 6 tons of giraffe meat from the 
Masai Mara Game Reserve. 
Personally passionate about the disappearance of clean 
water and environmental degradation’s effect in its own 
right, and negative impact on tourism, Chumo wants to 
be an example to inspire others: “I want to leave a legacy 
of patriotism in the force. I want to hear that people want 
to emulate me. This is what gives me the passion.”
Standardmedia.co.ke 16 April 2014
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The unregulated charcoal trade alone is estimated to involve a 
direct loss of revenues of 1.9 billion USD to African countries 
annually.145 With current urbanization trends, households are 
switching from wood fuel to the affordable, convenient and 
readily accessible charcoal. Wood fuel and charcoal account 
for up to 90% of the household energy consumption in some 
countries, according to FAO. 
FAO calculated Tropical Africa’s146 wood fuel consumption to 
about 502 million m3 in 1996, with an average increase of 7% 
every five years. While the increase of wood fuel consumption 
is large, the charcoal consumption increases twice as fast. In 
terms of woodfuel this equals about 636 million m3 in 2014, 
and 1,057 million m3 in 2050. 
In Kenya charcoal provides energy for 82% of urban, and 34% of 
rural households.147 The annual consumption is 1–1.6 million 
tons148 for 40 million citizens, with 25% urbanization. In Kenya 
there are thus about 18.4 million consumers who use 70 kg 
charcoal each per year. In Madagascar 85% of the population rely 
on charcoal, and with a population of 22.3 million people and a 
charcoal production of 1.19 million tons per year, they consume 
63 kg per consumer per year. On average charcoal consumers 
then consume about 66.5 kg/year. With the strong projected 
population growth and urbanization in Africa the relative use 
of charcoal as well as the absolute tonnage consumed will grow 
dramatically. If only 65% of Africans are charcoal consumers of 
66.5 kg each in 2050, they will consume 90.8 million tons of 
charcoal. Furthermore, according to one study, for every single 
percentage of increased urbanization, the demand for charcoal 
increases by 14 per cent.149 Based on these two projections the 
demand for charcoal can be expected to increase at least to 
between 79–90 million tons in 2050 unless an equally acces-
sible and practical energy source should emerge. This requires 
474–540 million m3 in roundwood equivalent. 
This massive demand for charcoal will lead to severe impacts 
such as large-scale deforestation, pollution and subse-
quent health problems in slum areas, especially for women. 
Increased charcoal demand will also strongly accelerate 
emissions from both forest loss and emissions of short-lived 
climate pollutants in the form of black carbon. The produc-
tion and trade in charcoal involves both an important income 
source for poor rural producers, and an inexpensive and 
highly demanded energy source for the urban poor. Char-
coal as a product has a legal status that varies widely between 
jurisdictions in and between countries. The trade ranges from 
regulated, through unregulated, illicit, and to illegal, and in 
some instances to comprise a conflict-fuelling currency.150
The illegal and unregulated charcoal trade
In Africa, official estimates by FAO put charcoal production at 
30.6 million tons in 2012, worth approximately USD 9.2–24.5 
billion annually. While the official exports from most African 
countries amount only to a few truckloads annually, available 
evidence suggests that a greater numbers of trucks are used 
to gather charcoal bags near protected areas at night, as well 
as across border points as directly observed by team members 
of the Rapid Response Unit first hand in East Africa, such as 
in Tanzania, and previously between Uganda and DRC, but 
also elsewhere in Africa. Analysis of satellite imagery reveals 
massive illegal logging in many protected areas, such as in 
conflict zones of DRC, or in North-eastern Madagascar, where 
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vessels load and export charcoal or timber, including rose-
wood. Internet listings reveal over 1,900 charcoal dealers in 
Africa alone, at least 300 officially exporting minimum orders 
of 10–20 tons of charcoal per shipment. The actual number 
is likely to be many times higher, and minimum daily orders 
for many individual exporters exceed the official total annual 
exports from some countries. For East, Central and West 
Africa, the net profits from dealing and taxing unregulated, 
illicit or illegal charcoal combined is estimated at a range of 
2.4–9 billion USD,151 compared to an estimated (European) 
combined street value of heroin in the East African market 
and cocaine in the west African market, worth USD 2.65 
billion.152 This indicates a vast illicit, unregulated trade in 
charcoal, involving illegal logging often in protected areas, 
large-scale deforestation, involvement of organized dealers 





Role of wood and illegal wildlife trade for 
threat finance
The illegal charcoal trade alone involves a direct loss of revenues of USD 1.9 billion 
to African countries annually. And this revenue often funds criminal networks. 
Furthermore, with current urbanization trends, households are switching from 
woodfuel to the affordable and readily accessible charcoal. This, in turn, without 
any regulation at all, represents a major threat of further evolution of organized 
crime involved in the illicit charcoal business. The favourable charcoal market 
conditions and the absence of regulation of the trade in practice constitute an 
open invitation for non-state armed groups to take control of the trade, which is 
enabling them with a substantial purchasing power.
Overall, militias across the continent create incomes 
through the trafficking and particularly control of the road 
network, ports, strategic trade points and border crossings 
with anything from common commodities to high-value 
products, of which common goods like charcoal remain 
of particular importance for incomes to both high and low 
levels militias. 
Prices on ivory are based on both cited reports and reports from 
rangers and Anti-poaching Units gathered informally during 
interviews as part of the trainings conducted under UNODC 
and INTERPOL (ca. 39 APU commanders or staff members 
interviewed informally from Tanzania, Zambia, Uganda, 
Kenya, Mozambique during training sessions 2011–2013). 
The prices are typically in the range of USD 150–400 per kg. 
These prices are far lower than quoted in the end-market in 
Asia, such as around USD 750 per kg of raw ivory in China.153 
There are examples of frontline poachers being paid USD 70 
per kg. Quoted ranges are from USD 70–550 with a median 
of USD 150–400 per kg raw ivory. 
Taxation system in eastern DR Congo conflict zone
Part of CNDP incomes from local resources
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50 kg sack of cement traded
30 kg bag of charcoal on sale in local markets
50 kg bag of coltan exported
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Iron roof house, per year
Small business owner, per year
Car passing check point
Small truck passing check point
Source: UN Security council,  S/2008/773.
Big truck passing check point
Figure 14: Militias, as here from DRC, put considerable emphasis upon controlling entrance roads to cities and the rod network, 
as well as ports, in order to tax any good passing. Here, charcoal, being the primary energy supply to cities and thus abundant in 




Income to non­state armed groups
In order to understand how much non-state armed groups 
can make, it is imperative to look at not the total number of 
killed elephants in Africa, but how elephants are distributed 
within the operational range and the striking range of militias 
or terrorist groups.
Southern Africa continues to hold the majority of Africa’s 
elephants, with close to 55% (270,000 elephants) of the known 
elephants on the continent. Eastern Africa holds 28% (130,000) 
and Central Africa 16% (16,000) (forest elephant population 
20–60,000). In West Africa, less than 2% (7,100 elephants) 
of the continent’s known elephants are spread out over the 
remaining 13 elephant range states. The numbers are gained 
using the category “definite” from the elephant database.154
This means that more than 90% of the “definite” population 
is located in east and the south – mostly beyond any conflict 
zone. Considering countries with on-going conflicts in West, 
Central and northern parts of Eastern Africa, approximately 
19,000 elephants are present inside or very near war zones. 
Additionally, within a 500-km strike range from conflict zones 
we can find an estimated 21,000 elephants in the Katavi, 
Ugalla and Moyowosi game reserves in eastern and southern 
Tanzania; another 38,000 in Congo, and some 35,000 in 
Gabon, although many in the southwest. Here the ‘definite’ 
and the ‘probable’ categories are used. We can assume that 
parks in parts of south-western Tanzania are within reach. 
Poaching levels are very high there, including by heavily 
armed poachers. Further, by including northern Gabon and 
parts of Congo, we get an additional ca. 19,000 in or near 
conflict zones, and another ca. 100,000 elephants in a 500 
km perimeter or slightly beyond. 
In 2012, poachers on horseback, reportedly Sudanese horse 
militias, killed several hundred elephants in Cameroon in 
a matter of a few months. In February 2013, the Gabonese 
Government announced the loss of at least half of the elephants 
in Minkebe National Park. As many as 11,000 individuals 
may have been killed between 2004 and 2012, an average of 
1,200 per year in that park alone. The levels of poaching are 
highest in central Africa, eastern parts of western Africa, as 
well as in southern Tanzania and Northern Mozambique (The 
Niassa corridor). The volume of the trade, the large individual 
shipments, and the high value of wildlife products point to 
the clear involvement of transnational organized crime. Ivory 
also provides a portion of income raised by militia groups in 
the DRC and CAR, and is likely a primary source of income to 
the Lord’s Resistance Army currently operating in the border 
triangle of South Sudan, CAR and DRC, directly overlapping 
and targeting elephants in Garamba and northern DRC and 
into CAR. Contacts, attacks and chance encounters with 
LRA overlap closely with elephant distribution range. Lack 
of control of the road network for taxing also suggests that 
ivory may be one of the few sources of income available to the 
LRA. Ivory similarly provides a source of income to Sudanese 
Janjaweed and other horse gangs operating between Sudan, 
Chad and Niger – striking over 600 km from their primary 
home range. 
PIKE numbers (the number of illegally killed elephants found 
divided by the total number of elephant carcasses encoun-
tered) for Central Africa is 70–80% (varying within coun-
tries) indicating high levels of poaching. The percentage of 
the total elephant populations of illegally killed elephants 
ranges from up to 15% in the worst hit areas, with reports of 
even higher proportions.155 A theoretical calculation, although 
speculative and with significant uncertainty, can nonetheless 
provide an indication of the possible scale. These numbers are 
not supported by official data, although anecdotal reports and 
unsystematic field observations support the estimates. The esti-
mate of scale is calculated using the following assumptions:
•	 Ca. 19,000 elephants are located within or very near 
conflict zones in countries with civil wars or significant 
unrest and armed non-state groups
•	 Ca. 100,000 elephants are seasonally located within a 
500-km striking range of these countries or zones (some 
uncertainty as some populations are beyond)
•	 Up to a maximum 15% of elephant populations are killed 
annually in or very near conflict zones (ca. 2,850 elephants)
•	 Ca. 5% of populations are killed annually in a 500-km 
perimeter (ca. 5,000 elephants)
•	 90% of killed elephants are killed by non-state armed 
groups in or near conflict zones (ca. 2,565 elephants)
•	 10% of killed elephants are killed by non-state armed 
groups in the perimeter of the striking range (ca. 500 
elephants)
•	 This gives a total of 2,565–3,065 elephants potentially 
killed by non-state armed groups or ca. 13% of the totally 
estimated killed elephants in Africa. 
The number of killed elephants in Africa remains unknown, 
so does the proportion killed by non-state armed groups such 
as militias in, near or within the striking range of militias. 
With a price range of USD 150–400 per kg and 10 kg of ivory 
per elephant on average, the gross value of ivory to non-state 
armed groups amounts to ca. 2,565–3,065 killed elephants 
per year or 25.7–30.65 tons of ivory, valued at USD 150–400 
per kg, giving a possible range of ivory as threat finance 
to non-state armed groups of ca. USD 3.9–12.3 million, 
dependent upon their ability to strike at elephant populations 
at greater distances.
Media and NGO reports156 suggesting that Al Shabaab was 
shipping out 30.6 tons of ivory or corresponding to ivory 
from 3,600 elephants per year out of southern Somalia are 
therefore likely highly unreliable. To do so, they would have to 
gather all or nearly all ivory from killed elephants from west, 
central and eastern Africa and bring it to one port in southern 
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Sources: UN Security Council, Somalia 
report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia 
and Eritrea submitted in accordance with 
resolution 2060, 2012 
Figure 16: The illegal charcoal trade controlled by Al Shabaab.
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Somalia. So far this route has not featured in any reporting as 
an ivory smuggling route. Both the Rapid Response team, as 
well as the Group of experts for Eritrea and Somalia reporting 
to the UNSC, have to date failed to establish such a connec-
tion in official reporting. Al Shabaab’s main income appears 
to be from charcoal, and taxing of other commodities, as well 
as possibly ex-pat finance.
Charcoal and its role for threat finance
Illicit taxing of charcoal, commonly up to 30% of the value at the 
point of sale, is conducted on a regular basis by organized crimi-
nals, militias and terrorist groups across Africa. Militias in DRC 
are estimated to make 14–50 million USD annually on road 
taxes (2001 figures, see UNSC, 2001 and UNEP-INTERPOL, 
2012). Al Shabaab’s primary income appears to be from their 
involvement in the charcoal trade and informal taxation at road-
block checkpoints and ports. At a single roadblock they have 
been able to make up to USD 8–18 million per year for taxing 
passing charcoal traffic in Badhaadhe District, Lower Juba 
Region.157 The charcoal export from Kismayo and Baraawe Ports 
in particular has increased since the UN Security Council-insti-
tuted charcoal export ban. Al Shabaab retains about one third of 
the income, which alone constitutes about USD 38–56 million. 
The overall size of the illicit charcoal export from Somalia has 
been estimated at USD 360–384 million per year.158
For the militias in Kivu and Al Shabaab in Somalia the range 
of income from charcoal is thus 60–124 million USD annually 
from charcoal and taxes alone. This is based on estimates from 
reports to the UNSC. African countries with on-going conflicts 
include Mali, CAR, DRC, Sudan and Somalia. All of these coun-
tries consume large amounts of charcoal. Their annual joint 
official charcoal production is ca. 4.52 million tons of wood char-
coal. Conservatively estimated the militia and terrorist groups, 
given the official FAOSTAT numbers of charcoal production 
and an estimated tax income to militias of 30% and involve-
ment in 30% of the trade, can easily make 111–289 million USD 
annually. This of course depends somewhat on consumer prices 
in the region (range USD 275–700 per ton, prices derived from 
local traders and official listings), their involvement in taxing, 
and the extent of their control of the illegal or unregulated char-
coal trade. More investigation is needed to ascertain the scale 
and precise role of charcoal for threat finance.
The charcoal trade will likely triple in the coming decades with 
rising demand. The rise in the charcoal trade will trigger a 
dramatic increase in deforestation in Africa with subsequent 
impacts on forest-related water resources, land degradation 
and loss of ecosystem services. It will also significantly raise the 
threat finance to non-state armed groups if left unchecked. By 
having networks and shell companies involved in the charcoal 
trade, militias or terrorist groups can also ensure an income 
outside their areas of operation, thus making incomes inde-
pendent of the success of their armed campaigns, enabling 
them to regroup and resurface again and again after apparent 
military defeat. Unlike illegal drugs, piracy, ransom, counter-
feit and wildlife crime the unregulated and at times illicit char-
coal trade represents a safe and convenient source of income 
that can be exploited by organized crime and non-state armed 
groups alike, far beyond their geographic areas of control. This 
mixing of legal, illicit and illegal trade is symptomatic of parts 
of the wildlife and illicit wood trade and requires a particular 
coordinated response beyond that of environmental or enforce-
ment agencies in isolation.
There is a risk that this trade can easily be further fuelled and 
organized also outside of Somalia. The domestic and trans-
national trade in charcoal from Madagascar, Mozambique, 
Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya is worth at least 1.7 billion USD 
annually. Charcoal trade may also be a possible source of 
income for Boko Haram although this remains uncertain at 
this stage. Furthermore, the scale of the finance from char-
coal enables non-state armed groups to purchase advanced 
arms and training, including ground to air portable man-pads 
and guided weapon systems from military stocks. The level 
of finance also enables them to undertake larger and more 
complicated military operations, taking control of road 
networks, border crossings and larger road, river and port 
infrastructure, where taxing of goods and in particular char-
coal provide a significant source of income. 
Furthermore, it enables them to establish dealer networks 
also in foreign countries including in the Gulf and the Middle 
East, or to arms suppliers. By having networks and shell 
companies involved in the charcoal trade, militias or terrorist 
groups can ensure an income independent of military success 
on the battlefield, enabling them to regroup and resurface 
again and again after apparent military defeat.
In addition, there is also a significant involvement of organ-
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Wood charcoal production in Africa
Figure 17: Wood charcoal production in Africa.
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The charcoal supply chain
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Figure 19a-b: The illicit charcoal trade in eastern DRC, but 
also into Uganda, Rwanda and Tanzania, is a significant 
threat to protected areas, forests and also a significant 





Illegal trade in forest and wildlife products, as well as the illegal exploitation of 
natural resources is now widely recognized as a significant threat to the environ-
ment, human well-being, food security as well as to sustainable development. This 
is reflected in a range of decisions from CITES, from the UN Commission on 
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, INTERPOL and the UN Security Council, 
including on Somalia and DRC.
Up until now, enforcement measures to reduce transnational 
environmental organized crime have been modest. Investigative 
capacity has been lacking or inadequate, and funding for protec-
tion of resources limited. Prosecution and sentences for envi-
ronmental crime often reflect petty crimes or minor offences, 
and too often they are limited to low-level impoverished crim-
inals. However, the illegal trade in forest and wildlife products 
also often violates tax laws, anti money laundering laws, and 
it may include involvement in organized crime, violence, traf-
ficking and even funding of non-state armed groups. Consid-
ering wildlife crime under these laws may sometimes provide a 
far more effective, serious and appropriate entry point of inves-
tigation and subsequent evaluation for prosecution. 
Consumer awareness
Among very important and effective responses to addressing 
illegal wildlife trade are demand reduction schemes by 
consumers. Although there have been some successes in 
demand reduction for illegally traded wildlife products, such 
responses require behavioural change outcomes, effected 
through greater awareness and understanding at the consumer 
end, including how wildlife and wood products are laundered 
through legal supply chains. Indeed, effective responses should 
involve a range of measures from demand reduction though 
socio-economic efforts, certification schemes and consumer 
awareness, more effective management, good governance and 
alternative livelihoods. These need to be coupled with enforce-
ment, including frontline protection, customs, strengthened 
legislation, policing and judiciary efforts. 
Consumer awareness and reducing demand is a long-term crit-
ical component that requires much further attention. Surveys 
of 1880 residents from a total of six Chinese cities in 2007,159 
revealed that that 43% of respondents had consumed some 
product alleged to contain tiger parts. Within this group, 71% 
said that they preferred wild products over farmed ones, with 
predominant products used were tiger bone plasters (38%) and 
tiger bone wine (6.4%). Of the respondents 88% knew that it 
was illegal to buy or sell tiger products, and 93% agreed that a 
ban in trade of tiger parts was necessary to conserve wild tigers. 
People from all income groups used tiger-bone plasters, with 
the highest demand among older consumers and women. 
Out of seven brands of plasters tested, none contained even 
traces of tiger bone,160 and a 2005–2006 survey of 518 traditional 
medicine stores in China, no plasters listing tigers as an ingre-
dient were found.161 Only 3% of the consumers believed that 
the products they purchased were fakes. Another 12% believed 
the products were real, while 85% were unsure whether the 
products used actually contained tiger ingredients.162
Consumer awareness programmes are therefore extremely 
important, and this applies not only to tiger parts, but also to 
the entire range of wildlife products, in order to close down the 
demand side. Correspondingly, consumer awareness is highly 
important in relation to the use of not only visible wood prod-
ucts such as furniture, panels and timber, but even more so 
regarding purchase of paper, which is where the majority of 
illegally harvested wood is laundered.
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Successes and progress
There are a number of successful recent developments in 
combating transnational organized environmental crime 
from both the international community as well as from indi-
vidual countries, including from Latin America, Africa and 
Asia that can be expanded, emulated, adapted and built upon. 
Some significant examples are given below, but they represent 
only a small portion of many on-going successful initiatives 
from the international community, NGOs and governments. 
Poaching for Shahtoosh wool caused a dramatic drop of likely 
80–90% or nearly a million Tibetan or Chiru antelopes in 
China in the 1990–2000s. This resulted in a significant police 
and military effort to prevent eradication. It was combined 
with the establishment of some of the largest protected areas 
in the world. Thus improved management and successful 
awareness campaigns combined with strict enforcement 
efforts to save the Tibetan antelope from extinction. Popula-
tions are slowly recovering, although they are still very vulner-
able and more monitoring and surveys are urgently needed. 
Brazil is probably one of the world’s leading countries in a wide 
enforcement effort to reduce illegal deforestation by tackling 
the full criminal chain and their networks. Deforestation in 
Brazil’s Amazon reached its lowest level in 2012, since moni-
toring of the forest began in 1988. It went down by 64–78%, 
dependent upon estimate, primarily as a result of a coordinated 
enforcement approach using satellite imagery and targeted 
police operations and investigations. The effort included front-
line protection and investigations, as well as prosecutions of 
ringleaders and networks. Here enforcement efforts have been 
the primary cause of the observed reduction in illegal logging. 
But importantly, the campaign is being supported by large-scale 
efforts through REDD and other initiatives to strengthen the 
participatory processes of indigenous peoples, stake holders 
and alternative livelihoods. The ratio has probably been ca. 90% 
civilian and 10% enforcement effort. Unfortunately, in most 
cases elsewhere in the world, authorities have not prioritized 
comparably robust enforcement efforts. Joining these two types 
of efforts is crucial for combating environmental crime.
Other important efforts include strengthening frontline 
protection such as the recently initiated and on-going large-
scale training of rangers in East Africa. In Tanzania especially, 
over 1,100 rangers have received specialized training in the 
past two years. The training covers tracking of poachers, tactics 
and wildlife crime scene management. It has been done under 
the auspices of INTERPOL and UNODC and has resulted in 
a series of frontline arrests linking suspects to the scene of 
crime. The training is improving not only rangers’ ability to 
stop and arrest poachers, but it also supports successful pros-
ecutions and good enforcement ethics based on evidence, 
prosecution and trial in court. Such efforts invest in a long-
term capacity and do not just provide short-term operations 
or enforcement efforts. These capacity-building efforts need 
to be continuously funded for the enforcement chain to be 
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Figure 20: Brazil managed to reduce deforestation in Brazil primarily through a targeted and strict enforcement effort using satel-
lite images to detect recent logging, followed by direct action by SWAT teams and investigators also of companies and networks, 
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able to cope with developments in the sophisticated illegal 
trade. An effective response to environmental crime must 
therefore include both good governance and enforcement 
efforts, both in the short and long-term. Governments and 
the international community must develop a permanent 
capacity to discourage, prevent and safeguard against crime, 
while building sustainable livelihoods. One-dimensional 
approaches, whether enforcement or socio-economic, cannot 
in isolation succeed against environmental crime, because it 
is a combined problem that comprises poverty, social and envi-
ronmental issues, organized crime and even armed groups.
In many areas in Africa, Latin America and Asia, there are still 
very few rangers in place. They often have low salaries. Trans-
portation is usually lacking to enforce thousands of square 
kilometres of protected areas. They are increasingly faced with 
armed poachers, even militias. Over 1,000 rangers are claimed 
killed in service to protect wildlife in the last decades. More 
than two hundred have been killed in the Virungas alone. 
Here the world´s last remaining mountain gorillas live. The 
rangers were killed because they interfered with the illegal 
charcoal business in the area. Salaries, training and increasing 
the presence of frontline rangers all require continuous and 
focused development support. Such investments will also 
reduce negative impacts on tourism and the welfare of the 
local population. It is imperative that donors and development 
funds support existing law-enforcement programmes and 
ranger and police academies in developing countries, as well 
as build basic enforcement presence. All these programmes 
and efforts strongly suffer from under-funding. Rushed imple-
mentation of advanced technology like cameras, sensors or 
aerial un-manned drones without documenting their effect in 
anti-poaching is unlikely to prove a substitute for well-trained 
and well-paid rangers, police, customs officers, investigators 
and judicial collaboration, along with community programmes 
and alternative livelihoods. Furthermore, any use of expensive 
technology is useless if no rangers are available to conduct 
follow-ups. Basic tracking and enforcement skills are still the 
most effective way to search and arrest poachers, but these 
fundamental methods require actual field presence, training 
and payment of rangers.
On customs, the UNODC-WCO Container Control Programme 
(CCP) has been successful in targeting sea and dry port container 
shipments in an increasing number of countries. Seizures 
include not only counterfeits and drugs, but also wildlife and 
timber products. On 23 and 29 January 2014 for example, two 
containers were seized in Lome, Togo. They contained 3.8 tonnes 
of ivory and 266 teak logs. The seizures also led to arrests. 
INTERPOL with support from various bilateral partners and 
UNODC and WCO, were able to alert authorities in Malaysia, 
Vietnam and China of this and other shipments in transit. 
International enforcement collaboration, such as the Inter-
national Consortium on Combating Wildlife Crime (ICCWC) 
which includes CITES, UNODC, INTERPOL, the World Bank 
and WCO, together with increased collaboration amongst 
agencies and countries, has created a more effective struc-
ture to provide support to countries in the fields of policing, 
customs, prosecution and the judiciary. Improved sharing of 
intelligence among agencies has also enabled INTERPOL to 
support countries in larger and more effective police oper-
ations, leading to larger seizures of illegal timber and wild-
life products. In 2013 Operation Lead, under INTERPOLs 
project LEAF, was conducted in Costa Rica and Venezuela. 
It resulted in 292,000 cubic meters of wood and wood 
products seized – equivalent to 19,500 truckloads (worth ca. 
USD 40 million). Operation Wildcat in East Africa involved 
wildlife enforcement officers, forest authorities, park rangers, 
police and customs officers from five countries ‒ Mozam-
bique, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. The 
operation resulted in 240 kg of elephant ivory and 856 timber 
logs seized and 660 arrests. Also seized were 20 kg of rhino 
horns, 302 bags of charcoal, 637 firearms, and 44 vehicles.
An Indonesian case has shown how money-laundering meas-
ures can lead to prosecutions for illegal logging. A UNODC 
training course in 2012 involved the Financial Investigative 
Unit (PPATK) and the Indonesian Anti-Corruption Agency 
(KPK), took trainers from the Jakarta capital level to local 
level in west Papua. Methods learned in the course revealed 
how Anti Money Laundering (AML) and Anti Corruption 
regimes can be used to detect investigate and prosecute illegal 
logging. After the course the PPATK detected highly suspi-
cious transactions. This, in turn led to an investigation and 
prosecution. A timber-smuggling suspect was sentenced to 
eight years of imprisonment after a legal appeal overturned 
the milder verdict handed down earlier this year by a court 
in West Papua. The suspect was originally charged with 
illegal logging, fuel smuggling and money laundering, and 
the suspect was in February found guilty of just one charge – 
illegal logging – and was sentenced to just two years in prison 
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with a USD 4,000 fine. The suspect was acquitted of money 
laundering, despite evidence showing USS 127 million had 
passed through his accounts. An appeal filed by the Prosecu-
tors trying the case resulted in a conviction of money laun-
dering. The High Court of Jayapura, Papua, sentenced the 
suspect to eight years imprisonment on 2 May 2014, revealing 
the scale of illegal logging and smuggling.
Resolutions have also been adopted by the UN governing 
bodies. These include ECOSOC Resolution 2013/40 on crime 
prevention and criminal justice responses to illicit trafficking 
in protected species of wild fauna and flora, the 2014 Commis-
sion on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice resolution 
on strengthening a targeted crime prevention and criminal 
justice response to combat illicit trafficking in forest products, 
including timber as well as the General Assembly Resolution 
68/193 emphasizing that “coordinated action is critical to 
eliminate corruption and disrupt the illicit networks that drive 
and enable trafficking in wildlife, timber and timber products, 
harvested in contravention of national laws. The INTERPOL 
General Assembly adopted a Resolution in November 2010 
(AG-2010-RES-03) recognising that INTERPOL plays a 
leading role in supporting international law enforcement 
efforts to tackle environmental crime, which is transnational, 
involving organised crime, who engage in other crime types 
including murder, corruption, fraud and theft.
Recently, UNODC have developed the Global Programme for 
Combating Wildlife and Forest Crime to strengthen the crime 
prevention and criminal justice response, and are providing 
support to a wide range of countries.163
At INTERPOL, the Environmental Crime Unit164 has an estab-
lished record of training law enforcement and conducting 
successful operations across a number of countries to combat 
environmental crime from wildlife crime to illegal logging. 
Established in 2009, the unit became an official Sub-Directo-
rate of INTERPOL in 2013.”
A number of initiatives involving direct collaboration between 
UNODC, WCO, CITES, INTERPOL, UNEP and other UN 
agencies provide a new approach to share and exchange 
vital information, support and training to countries under 
particularly high pressure from environmental crime. These 
initiatives have revealed important lessons and yielded signif-
icant early results. However, the scale and coordination of the 
efforts must be substantially increased and a widened effort 
implemented. They must be combined with efforts on good 
governance, management and consumer awareness to ensure 
a long-term demand reduction. It is particularly crucial to 
support the countries directly, as financial resources need to 
be directed towards efforts with effect on the ground, whether 
in enforcement, governance or consumer awareness.
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Several NGOs, such as The Diane Fossey Fund, help 
protect and rescue gorilla orphans. Following the release 
of the UNEP-INTERPOL Rapid Response report, the UN 
peace keeping force in DRC assisted in transporting 







The consequences of the illegal trade in wildlife span environmental, societal 
(including security), and economic impacts – including affecting the resource 
base for local communities, and resulting in the theft of natural capital at national 
levels. The illegal trade in wildlife is therefore a barrier to sustainable development, 
involving a complex combination of weak environmental governance, unregulated 
trade, loopholes and laundering systems used to conduct serious transnational 
crime, and undermining government institutions and legitimate business.
The illegal trade in wildlife involves a wide range of flora and 
fauna, across all continents. The pace, level of sophistication, 
and globalized nature of the illegal trade in wildlife is beyond 
the capacity of many countries and individual organizations 
to address. The illegal trade in wildlife constitutes not only a 
very significant criminal sector, involving organized crime, 
violent conflicts and terrorism, but it also entails poverty, devel-
opment and governance challenges. Of particular relevance is 
the increasing involvement of transnational organized criminal 
networks in the illegal trade of wildlife, as well as the signifi-
cant impact to the environment and sustainable development. 
Current trends suggest priority attention be focused on the 
illegal trade in charcoal and other forest products (including 
paper, timber and pulp, as well as endangered high-value 
species like rosewood, African cherry and wild mahogany), and 
the illegal trade derived from various charismatic mammals 
(especially, but not limited to, tigers, elephants and rhinos), 
and many other species including sharks, manta rays and stur-
geon, to mention a few. Here, CITES continues to be the lead 
authority controlling and monitoring such trade.
Responses to the illegal trade in wildlife need to reflect the 
differentiated and shared characteristics of various supply 
chains, and recognize that consumer demand remains 
the most important driver of the illegal trade in wildlife. 
The economic, social, and environmental impacts of the 
illegal wildlife trade can only be effectively tackled if both 
the demand and supply elements of the chain are targeted, 
encompassing elements of deterrence, transparency, legal 
clarity and enforcement, behavioural change, and the develop-
ment of alternative livelihoods. This will require both national 
and international stakeholders to be engaged, including envi-
ronmental, enforcement and development sectors, as well as 
stakeholders involved in security and peacekeeping missions. 
At the national and regional level, numerous strong recent 
commitments have been made in relation to the many aspects 
of illegal trade in wildlife, and immediate, decisive and collec-
tive action is now required to narrow the gap between these 
existing commitments – including those made under the 
various multilateral environmental agreements and UN agen-
cies – and their implementation. In particular, strengthened 
environmental legislation, compliance and awareness, and 
support to enforcement agencies is required to reduce the 
role of illegal wildlife trade (especially of charcoal) for threat 
finance to non-state armed groups and terrorism.
Strengthened enforcement efforts need to be complemented 
by broader development and awareness raising efforts. 
End-user markets need to be further analysed, and consumer 
awareness campaigns need to be systematically designed, 
supported and implemented. There is a central role for civil 
society and the private sector in such efforts, and also to iden-
tify alternatives in some instances to consumer demands for 
illegally traded wildlife products.
At the international level, a comprehensive and coordi-
nated UN system-wide response to support holistic national 
approaches to address the illegal trade in wildlife is an impor-
tant component of the global response. Such a response, 
with additional support from the enforcement sector, would 
further strengthen coordinated efforts in relation to coherent 
legislation, environmental law, poverty alleviation and devel-
opment support, awareness raising and demand reduction.
Support from the international and bilateral donor commu-
nity will be essential to recognize and address the illegal trade 
in wildlife as a serious threat to sustainable development, 
and support national, regional and global efforts for the 
effective implementation of, compliance with, and enforce-
ment of targeted measures to curb illegal trade in wildlife. 
In particular, investment in demand reduction campaigns is 
urgently required, and in capacity building and technological 
support to national law enforcement agencies to enable them 
to further protect key populations of species threatened by 
illegal trade. Such support must be accompanied by renewed 




Acknowledge the multiple dimensions of environ­
mental crime and its serious impact on the environment 
and sustainable development goals, and help support and 
balance the appropriate coordination and sharing of infor-
mation from stakeholders, such as civil society, private sector, 
indigenous peoples, governments and a wider UN system 
with the need and recognition of also the role of law enforce-
ment in good environmental governance. 
Call for a comprehensive coordinated UN system 
and national approach to environmental crime by
helping coordinate efforts on environmental legislation and 
regulations, poverty alleviation and development support with 
responses from the enforcement sector to curb environmental 
crime, as part of a holistic approach to challenge the serious 
threat to both the environment and sustainable development 
caused by the continued environmental crime.
Further call upon UNEP as the global environ­
mental authority to address the serious and rising
environ mental impacts of environmental crime and to 
engage the relevant coordination mechanisms of the UN 
system to support countries and national, regional and inter-
national law enforcement agencies with relevant environ-
mental information to facilitate their efforts to combat the 
illegal trade in wildlife species and their products, as well as 
illegal logging and illegal trade in timber. 
Calls upon the entire international and bilateral 
donor community to recognize and address environ­
mental crime as a serious threat to sustainable develop­
ment and revenues, and to support national, regional and global 
efforts for the effective implementation of, compliance with and 
enforcement of targeted measures to curb illegal trade in wildlife 
species and their products as well as illegal logging in timber.
Support immediate, decisive and collective action 
to narrow the gap between commitments and 
compliance, such as the ones expressed in multilateral envi-
ronmental agreements, through national implementation 
and enforcement, including the relevant decisions and reso-
lutions taken by their governing bodies intended to combat 
the illicit trade in wildlife and forest products. 
Identify end­user markets and systematically 
design, support and implement where appropriate 
consumer awareness campaigns focusing on high 
consumer end-markets. Call upon both Governments and the 
UN system to effectively work with and engage civil society and 
the private sector in efforts to identify alternatives to consumer 
demands for traded wildlife species and forest products.
Strengthen awareness through certification 
schemes, such as e.g. the Forest Stewardship Council 
(FSC), to facilitate consumer recognition of legal and illegal 
products. This especially applies to such wood products as 
paper that currently include the largest share of import-ex-
ports of tropical wood, as well as to CITES-listed species and 
their products. To this end, both voluntary, market and legisla-
tive approaches could enhance collaboration between govern-
ments, civil society and the private sector. 
Strengthen institutional, legal and regulatory 
systems to further combat corruption to effectively
address wildlife-related offences and to ensure that legal trade 
is monitored and managed effectively.
Strengthen international and development support 
to the entire enforcement chain, including frontline, 
investigator, customs, prosecutors and the judiciary, with 
particular reference to environmental crime to support legal 
revenues and sustainable development, and to reduce the 
impacts on the environment from environmental crime. 
Strengthen support to INTERPOL, UNODC, WCO 
and CITES, such as through ICCWC as well as
individual programmes, to enable them to support member 
states and other relevant stakeholders to further identify, 
develop and implement the most appropriate responses 
to environmental crime, reflecting and acknowledging the 
serious threats and effects it has on environmental govern-
ance, wildlife, ecosystems and the services it provides.
Invest in capacity building and technological 
support to national environment, wildlife and law
enforcement agencies to enable them to further protect 
key populations of iconic endangered species threatened by 
poaching, such as but not limited to, rhinos, tigers and the 
African elephant as a necessary response to safeguard these 
species from poaching, alongside renewed efforts to strength-
ening habitat protection and management. 
Strengthen environmental legislation, compliance 
and awareness and call upon enforcement agencies
and countries to reduce the role of illicit trade and 
taxing of forest and wildlife products for threat finance 
to non-state armed groups and terrorism. Strengthen specif-
ically the research on the possible role of trade in wildlife 
and timber products including charcoal for threat finance 













































Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Central African Republic
Environmental Investigation Agency
Elephant Trade Information System, system for tracking 
illegal trade in ivory and other elephant products
EU programme: Ensuring Legal Timber Trade and 
Strengthening Forest Governance
EU Statistics agency
UN Food and Agriculture Organization
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, Rwandan 
Hutu rebel group based in east of DRC known for French 
name Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda
International Consortium on Combating Wildlife Crime 
(CITES, Interpol, UNODC, World Bank, WCO)
International Criminal Police Organization
Interpol Law Enforcement Assistance for Forests
International Tropical Timber Organization
Indonesia Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi 
Pemberantasan Korupsi)
Lord’s Resistance Army
Official Development Assistance, OECD term
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Proportion of Illegally Killed Elephants, calculated as 
number of illegally killed elephants found divided by the 
total number of elephant carcasses encountered, aggre-
gated by year for each site
Indonesia Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis 
Center (Pusat Pelaporan dan Analisis Transaki Keuangan)
United Nations Economic and Social Council
United Nations Environment Programme
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UN collaborative initiative on Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and forest Degradation
Beyond REDD: The role of conservation, sustainable 
management of forests and enhancement of forest 
carbon stocks in reducing emissions
Round Wood Equivalent, measure of volume of logs 
when converting between tons and cubic meters, or when 
detailing how much roundwood went into a wood product
United Nations Security Council
UNODC-WCO Container Control Programme
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